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PREFACE
I began this dissertation by writing about A, N.
Prior's counterexamples to the thesis that no ethical
conclusions can be deduced from non-ethical premises. Prior*
had, I thought, said something both clear and true about an
important and attractive principle - a rare combination in
ethics. Until I considered some replies to Prior's
objection, however, I suspected that his point was, like so
much of what is both clear and true, a triviality. It was
only after observing the failure of various patches, some
quite elaborate, proposed in defense of the autonomy thesis
that I came to think Prior's point may be serious- Chapter
5 details my observations about these proposals.
The obvious next step would have been for me to propose
a better interpretation of the autonomy thesis. It occurred
to me that the trouble might lie in the concept of
deduction, since at least some of Prior's deductions rely on
features of standard logic that have seemed unnatural to
some philosophers. I thought something like "relevant
entailment" or some more epistemic kind of logic might
help. But I found no extant system that fit, and my trying
to produce an alternative would have moved the project to
another field.
My conviction that the autonomy thesis is not easily
repaired to meet Prior's objections did nothing to make me
doubt that there is something right (even importantly right)
iv
about th© th©sis. I just saw nothing d©c©ntly clear about
what it might be. I came to suspect it may be no principle
at all but just a bit of methodological advice: when you
encounter an argument for an evaluative conclusion with no
apparent evaluative premise, look for a suppressed
evaluative premise.
Yet, reflection about Chapter 6 inclines me to think
there may after all be something more particular to the
autonomy thesis. In that chapter, I object against an
attempt by Derek Parfit to derive a certain evaluative
conclusion from a metaphysical theory. Parfit argues that
his "reductionist" theory of persons tells against the "Self-
interest Theory" of rationality, according to which each
person's ultimate rational aim is to do what would be best
for himself. My idea, roughly, is that the Self-interest
Theory can be recast in the terms of Parfit 's theory of
persons. Thus interpreted, it faces no threat from the
metaphysical theory. I surmise that something like this is
always available, and that this is what the autonomy of
ethics is about. I surmise, that is, that for any
evaluative principle and any nonevaluative implication it
has, there is a principle with the same evaluative content
but lacking the nonevaluative implication: the evaluative
content can be extracted from any particular setting.
Unfortunately, it remains unclear exactly what I am
surmising, since the concept of evaluative content, at best,
needs some work (the evaluative content of a principle
V
cannot be anything as simple as the set of particular
obligations it implies, say)
.
It might seem that there is some connection between the
autonomy of ethics and the issue (s) of moral realism. Both
might be described as involving relations between facts and
values. Indeed, Bernard Williams has recently suggested
they are "at heart" the same issue:
There are genuine ethical, and ultimately metaphysical,
concerns underlying the worries about ought and and
the naturalistic fallacy. At the heart of them is an
idea that our values are not "in the world," that a
properly untendentious description of the world would
not mention any values, that our values are in some
sense imposed or projected on our surroundings. [1]
Williams does not say "moral realism" here, but the phrases
"in the world" and "projected on our surroundings" indicate
he means to claim that autonomism and anti-naturalism are
motivated by anti-realism.
Against this claim, however, there is at least the case
of Moorean non-naturalism - a non-naturalism certainly not
motivated by any idea that values are "projected on our
surroundings". In fact, I see no neat way to line up moral
autonomism with (or against) moral realism. Besides the
Moorean autonomist realist case, there are clear cases of
autonomist anti-realism provided by noncognitivists . Among
anti-autonomists, there are subjective naturalists who
affirm that values are projected on our surroundings; but
VI
t^GiTG aiTG also naturalists who claiin to bG inoiral rGalists
and would dony thorG is projGction at work - PGtor Railton
(whosG thGory is thG subjGct of Chaptor 3) is onG.
WhilG I am confidGnt that "moral roalism" namos no
issuG VGry cIosg to thG issuG of autonomism, I do not claim
to know what issuG (if any) it doGS namG. ChaptGrs 1 and 2
arG about a numbor of attompts to charactGrizG such an
issuG. I arguG that Gach is in somG way inadGquatG. Many
arG simply obscurG, but thGrG is a morG particular problem
in most of them (a problem more salient in the collection of
accounts taken together) as to how the objectivity of
evaluations is supposed to be related to moral realism. In
some cases, it looks as though objectivity is not involved
at all; in others, there seem to be attempts to describe
some sort of objectivity (different sorts in different
cases) but this usually turns out to be less than full-
blooded objectivity. Generally, it is not clear whether
"reality" is supposed to include objectivity or replace it,
or perhaps consist of it. Though I am not prepared to say
what full-blooded objectivism might be (I take Moore to give
the paradigm)
,
I claim in Chapters 3 and 4 that, of two
theories designed to achieve a measure of objectivity by
nonstandard means (one "projectivist, " one naturalist),
neither achieves a very impressive measure.
Objectivism about value is also part of the topic of
Chapter 7, in which I question another of Parfit's arguments
against the Self-interest Theory of rationality. Parfit
Vll
presents examples allegedly showing that self-interest might
conflict with other goals a person might have, and that,
since pursuing these other goals can be more rational than
pursuing self-interest, self-interest can conflict with
rationality. Given the theories of self-interest Parfit
considers, the examples are convincing. His mistake, in my
opinion, is that he admits as a possibility an objective
theory of self-interest, but does not take it seriously
enough to consider more than a caricature. I suggest some
ways in which making an obj activist theory of self-interest
more plausible would make Parfit 's examples less
compelling. Once again, it seems to me, a little
objectivism is worse than none at all.
The main evaluative concepts in Chapters 3,6, and 7 are
not moral obligation and moral value but rationality and
self-interest (what Railton calls "non-moral individual
value" and others call "prudential value") . The questions
about the status of evaluations with which much of this
dissertaion is concerned apply to both kinds, and often seem
more approachable in the non-moral cases, where at least
some complications (problems about what makes an evaluation
moral, for instance) are absent. In Chapter 7 and the
appendix, however, I discuss relations between the two kinds
of evaluation. Parfit 's ultimate example is one in which
moral considerations are supposed to be manifestly superior
to considerations of self-interest, and Fred Feldman argues
Vlll
that moral obligations are superior to other obligations. I
try to show that neither has conclusively established the
superiority of moral evaluations.
NOTES
1. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 128.
2. About notation: I sometimes use "E", ">", and for
existential quantifier, material conditional, and negation.
I often use numbers in square brackets or parentheses
instead of subscripts and superscripts.
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I discuss in this work several issues in recent
ethical theory, most of them issues about the relations
between evaluative concepts and metaphysical concepts.
The first part is about the question whether there
is some clear sense to the expression "moral realism"
that makes it an appropriate title for a fundamental
position in ethics. In Chapters 1 and 2, I survey a
number of attempts to characterize such a position.
These generally describe moral realism as the thesis that
there are moral facts independent of us, but this
description is open to various significantly different
interpretations. I argue that each is problematic,
particularly in connection with the (also problematic)
distinction between "objectivism" and "subjectivism" in
ethics. Chapters 3, and 4 are criticisms of some recent
views about moral realism.
A much older issue about relations between facts and
values concerns the thesis that evaluations cannot be
derived from (nonevaluative) facts. A. N. Prior has
shown that at least one straightforward rendition of that
X
thesis is straightforwardly false. In Chapter 5, l
examine a number of attempts to formulate the thesis in a
way that makes it at least controversial. I find none
that succeeds
.
One recent effort to derive evaluative results from
a metaphysical theory is due to Derek Parfit. He argues
that his "reductionist" theory of the nature of persons
tells against the "Self-interest Theory of Rationality",
according to which each person's ultimate rational aim is
to do what would be best for himself. In Chapter 6, I
criticize this argument. In Chapter 7, I discuss another
of Parfit 's arguments against the Self-interest theory.
In the Appendix, I examine Fred Feldman's recent answer
to the ancient question "Why should I be moral?".
xi
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CHAPTER 1
WHAT IS MORAL REALISM?
Th© expression "inoiral realisin'' occurs frequently
and prominently in recent ethical literature. it has
been linked with most of the current controversies in
ethics - relativism, externalism, dilemmas,
explanations, supervenience, epistemology,
phenomenology, and more. It seems to be a term of
neither praise nor derogation - some writers call
themselves moral realists, some call their opponents
moral realists. It seems not to designate a position
philosophers try to establish or refute on the way to
some more important conclusion, but a position they
consider fundamentally important in its own right. But
What position is it?
The work of Michael Dummett is responsible for much
of the current interest in realism, but Dummett, while
he opposes realism in a variety of metaphysical areas,
does not venture into ethics. Williams may have been
the first to suggest that Dummett 's ideas have an
application in ethics. In "Consistency and Realism", he
says "Ethical Realism" is "the view that moral
judgements were assertions reporting moral states of
affairs." He goes on to give this clue about his aim in
introducing the expression:
1
Such a view, one version of which is represented by
Intuitionisin
,
is sometiines called Objectivism; but
this is a hopeless label for this, as for most
purposes, since, apart from the confusion it
generates, there seems no reason why a view which
held moral judgements to be expressions of rules or
applications of rules should not equally be called
Objectivist under some conditions, e.g.
,
if it also
held that men could all come to accept these rules
in the light of rational reflection. The view in
question might better be called Ethical Realism;
and the Ethical realist is the one who so much
emphasizes the claim that moral judgements can be
true or false. [1]
Though "objectivism" may well deserve a rest, I'm
not sure what Williams is holding against it. Since I
don't see why a view should be called "objectivist" just
because it holds everyone could agree about some rules
in the light of rational reflection. Even less clear is
whether Williams means to use "Ethical Realism" as
anything other than the denial of noncognitivism. To
hold that moral judgments are assertions reporting moral
states of affairs and to emphasize that they can be true
or false seems to be just to reject moral non-
cognitivism. Of course, nothing should be called "anti-
noncognitivism", but what about "cognitivism"? Maybe
that has too epistemic an aura. Some people (a small
minority) even seem to use "noncognitivism" for
2
the epistemological thesis that moral knowledge is
impossible rather than, as is far more common, for the
thesis that moral judgments are not assertions, hence
lack truth-values, hence are not knowable. Maybe this
is why Williams prefers "Ethical Realism". Then again,
maybe Williams does intend "Ethical Realism" to name
just the opposite of noncognitivism.
In what follows I give reasons for thinking "moral
realism" is by now not in much better shape than
"objectivism" itself. Various attempts to say what
"moral realism" means disagree in a number of confusing
ways, and each suffers from some measure (in most cases,
a large measure) of obscurity. Furthermore, I see no
clear reason to introduce a term with so much potential
for trouble.
Williams's account of Ethical Realism does not
bear much resemblance to most accounts of moral realism.
On most accounts, realism is not the view that
statements of a certain kind can be true or false (or
even a view emphasizing that they can be true or false)
but rather a view about what it is for them to be true
or false, or about whether their truth or falsehood
depends on certain other things. As we'll see, the
general form of most accounts is: moral realism holds
that moral judgments are true in virtue of facts
independent of us. Of course, there remains plenty of
3
rooin for divsrsity in th© ©xplanations of ”in virtue of"
and "indpendent of us".
Nontheless, G. Sayre-McCord has quite recently,
even in the face of obvious diversity, written that "the
many moral realisms" (and even realism in other areas)
can be captured by a single criterion:
Wherever it is found, I'll argue, realism involves
embracing just two theses: (1) The claims in
question, when literally construed, are literally
true or false (cognitivism)
, (2) and some are
literally true. [2]
Since Sayre-McCord makes it clear that the first clause
asserts not bivalence but only that some of the claims
in question are true or false, the second clause seems
sufficient to cover both theses.
An overwhelming difficulty here is that Sayre-
McCord refuses to give a hint about what we should make
of "literal". He seems to think it doesn't matter:
The notions of 'literal construal' and 'literal
truth' will obviously carry a lot of weight in this
account of realism. Significantly, though, most
realism debates are not especially sensitive to how
these notions are understood. As long as we're
working with theories of meaning and truth that
allow the distinctions between cognitive and
noncognitive discourse, and between claims that are
true and those that aren't, all the positions
4
relevant to the realism debate in ethics can be
reproduced. [3]
Clearly, Sayre-McCord intends to count noncognitivist
theories as anti-realist. He also holds that "error
theories" (in particular J.L. Mackie's, see p. 13
below) are anti-realist because they hold all moral
statements are false. It might seem that only these are
ruled anti-realist by his criterion, but in fact, he
claims that subjectivism is usually an anti-realist
position in ethics, and that his criterion provides an
explanation:
The reason is that most versions of subjectivism
and intersubjectivism give radically implausible
accounts of the truth-conditions for moral
statements as literally construed . . .when faced with
an implausible account of the truth-conditions for
moral claims, the charitable interpretation of the
proposal is that it rests on the view that moral
claims, as literally construed, should be
jettisoned in favor of some new language. Such a
proposal, if it is to be taken seriously, will have
to find its motivation in a prior acceptance of
anti-realism for moral claims as literally
construed. [4]
If this putative explanation succeeded in explaining how
subjectivist theories are counted anti-realist by the
criterion, it would just as well, since it appeals to no
feature of subjectivist theories other than the radical
5
implausibility of their truth-conditions, show also that
radically implausible theories are counted anti-
realist (or at least that they are counted anti-realist
if charitably interpreted)
. But radical implausibility
cannot be the preserve of anti-realists. So, if we are
to interpret Sayre-McCord's proposal charitably, we must
suppose it contains something other than what meets the
eye.
Simon Blackburn's (1971) "Moral Realism" contains
the first use I find of this expression. He clearly
means by it something other than what Williams means by
"Ethical Realism". Blackburn claims moral realism does
not follow from the view that moral statements can be
«
true or false. He holds that moral statements can be
true, though true in a peculiar way (a way we might be
tempted to describe as noncognitive) and claims to be an
anti-realist. He introduces the term thus:
I shall call the view that the truth of moral
utterances is to consist in their correspondence
with some fact or state of affairs 'moral
realism'... Another way of characterizing realism,
adopted by Dummett, would be as the belief that for
any moral proposition there must be something in
virtue of which either it or its negation is true.
This certainly points to the same view. [5]
He seems to be suggesting these principles:
6
MRI (u) (u is a moral utterance > the truth of u
consists in u's correspondence with some fact or
state of affairs)
;
MR2 (p) (p is a moral proposition > ( (Ex) (p is
true in virtue of x) or (Ex)((-p) is true in
virtue of x) ) )
.
Ten years later, Blackburn characterizes moral
realism in yet another way:
The projectivist holds that our nature as moralists
is well explained by regarding us as reacting to a
reality which contains nothing in the way of
values, duties, rights and so forth; a realist
thinks it is well explained only by seeing us as
able to perceive, cognize, intuit, an independent
moral reality. He holds that the moral features of
things are the parents of our sentiments, whereas
the Humean holds that they are their children. [6]
The gist of this seems to be:
MR3 We are able to know an independent moral
reality.
7
These are obscure principles. To assess them
seriously we would need explanations of "consists in its
correspondence with", "true in virtue of", and,
especially, "independent moral reality". l won't try to
interpret them here - they serve mainly to announce some
themes that will return in less obscure form [7]. But
we can notice that they seem not to be equivalent. MR2
clearly implies that every moral proposition either is
true or has a true negation, while MRl does not clearly
imply this. MRl and MR2 seem to be compatible with
theories according to which moral statements assert that
certain agents or groups of agents have certain
attitudes, but MR3 looks as though it may exclude such
theories, since the moral reality there is according to
them is, at least in some senses, not an "independent"
moral reality. Notice also that MR3 has an epistemic
element apparently absent from MRl and MR2
.
A somewhat less obscure characterization, again
credited to Dummett, is in Philippa Foot's "Moral
Realism and Moral Dilemmas";
...if realism is what Dummett means by realism then
... a realist theory of ethics would be one that
refused to let the possession of truth or falsity
by a particular ethical proposition stand or fall
by our capacity for assigning truth or falsity to
it. ...Those who say that where the solution of
some ethical conflicts is beyond our capacities
8
there will nevertheless be a solution which is
perhaps known to God are realists; those who deny
it are anti-realists as regards the class of
propositions in which moral judgments are asserted.
[ 8 ]
I take Foot to be suggesting that moral realism is this:
MR4 <>(Es) (s is a moral statement & ((s is true &
we cannot know s is true) or (s is false & we
cannot know s is false) ) )
.
We can find some clarification of the force of "cannot
know" in Dummett's concept of "effective decidability".
He says a statement, p, is effectively decidable when "p
is a statement of such a kind that we could in a finite
period of time bring ourselve into a position in which
we were justified in asserting or denying p." [9] I
expect something like this is what Foot has in mind when
she writes about "our capacity for assigning truth or
falsity", so we might reformulate MR4 as
MR4 ' <>(Es) (s is a moral statement & s is true or
false & s is not effectively decidable)
.
MR4 ' is clearly opposed to standard noncognitivist
theories, which hold that moral statements lack truth-
values, and perhaps, though less clearly, opposed to
9
Blackburn's nonstandard noncognitivism. But Foot says
this sort of realism is "distinct from cognitivism".
While she doesn't specify how it is distinct from
cognitivism, we might surmise that she takes it to
oppose subjectivism as well as noncognitivism. I will,
for now, use "subjectivism" to include all cognitivist
theories that analyse moral terms by appeal to
subjective states. In this sense, there are
subjectivist theories that seem to be compatible with
MR4'. Certain statements about subjective attitudes are
not effectively decidable in Dummett's sense -
statements about subconscious attitudes, for instance,
and statements that fail to be effectively decidable
because no decision procedure would be finite, such as
statements about approval by the majority of all people
who will ever have lived. [10] MR4 ' counts as realist
any theories that include such statements among their
analyses of moral statements.
While these results about subjectivism may not be
contrary to Foot's intentions, MR4 ' has other results
that are clearly incorrect. Consider a form of
intuitionism according to which moral statements have a
kind of self-evidence: anyone who reflects about a true
one is justified in believing it true, and anyone who
reflects about a false one is justified in believing it
false. The view is not an attractive one. As far as I
know, it has entirely lacked proponents. Perhaps only
10
j ®ctiVG ststGS could plsusibly bG hGld to hsvG thG
GpistGmic fGaturG in quGstion. But this is not a
plausiblG thGory and it is not subjGctivist
. It holds,
implausibly, that, though thoy havG thG GpistGmic
fGaturG, moral truths arG "truG in virtuG of an
indGpGndGntly Gxisting roality" - thoy'ro truG in virtuG
of facts about gods or stars or utilities or something
else. I see no reason to suppose such a theory must be
incoherent rather than just implausible. If it is not
incoherent, it should be counted realist by an
acceptable account of what moral realism is, but is
counted anti-realist by MR4 '
.
At this point, a closer look at Dummett's own
writings may be indicated. For one thing, Dummett says
"the dispute [about realism] can arise only for
classes of statements for which it is admitted on
all sides that there may not exist evidence either
for or against a given statement." [11]
My criticism of MR4' turns on the failure of one side to
admit that there can be moral statements about which we
cannot have evidence. Dummett might regard that side as
beyond the pale - neither realist nor anti-realist. It
is, he claims, this fact, that the dispute can only
arise when possible lack of evidence is admitted, "which
makes acceptance of the law of excluded middle for
statements of a given class a crucial test for whether
someone takes a realist view of statements of that
11
class. The anti-realist cannot allow that the law of
excluded middle is generally valid: the realist may, and
characteristically will." [12] This test [Dummett later
prefers to say it is the law of bivalence rather than
the law of excluded middle that is at issue.] is a
combination of the idea that realism is a matter of
taking truth and falsity to be independent of our
evidence, with the admission that there may be evidence
for neither the truth nor the falsity of some statements
- If truth and falsity depend on our evidence, as anti-
realism holds, and evidence is sometimes missing, then
truth and falsity are sometimes missing. So the anti-
realist holds some moral statements are neither true nor
false and the realist denies this. Dummett apparently
proposes the bivalence test as only a sufficient
condition for being a realist theory, that is, he seems
committed to:
MRS If a moral theory holds that every moral
statement is true or false, it is a realist theory.
The converse is not particularly plausible. It seems
perfectly possible for a moral realist to reject
bivalence for reasons other than that the truth of moral
statements depends on our evidence. A moral realist
might, for example, hold that moral truth depends on
facts about subatomic particles and that in some cases
12
there are no such facts. Perhaps a theory making this
claim would be anti-realist about subatomic particles
(and perhaps not) but that doesn't seem a good reason to
call it anti-realist about ethics.
One problem here is that few moral theories come
equipped with theories of meaning and truth.
Noncognitivist theories, to some extent, do involve
theories of meaning, but ordinary subjectivist and
conventionalist theories do not. Interpreted according
to standard theories of truth, these theories are
bivalent, though bivalence may fail for some if they're
taken together with Dummett's anti-realist conception of
truth. That is, some may imply that we cannot have
evidence about some moral statements.
A more particular problem is presented by J.L.
Mackie's "error theory", which has been construed as
asserting that all moral statements are false. What
Mackie actually says is: "although most people in making
moral judgements implicitly claim, among other things,
to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive,
these claims are all false." [13] Asserting that the
class of moral statements is monovalent isn't all that
simple - false moral statements have negations, and the
negations can't very well be false too. Still, an error
theorist might say the negations are not moral
statements (moral statements being the ones that "imply
something objectively prescriptive") or he might try to
13
restrict his claim to "positive" moral statements,
allowing the rest to be true. In neither case is there
reason to suppose bivalence fails. So, if error
theories are, as a number of writers suppose, anti-
theories, then bivalence provides not even a
sufficient condition for realism in ethics.
The reader may wish to ponder the question whether
error theories should be counted realist - they do hold
that moral statements have truth-conditions dependent on
an independently existing moral reality, a moral
reality, at least, that would if it existed be
independent of us but they hold that that reality
doesn't exist.
In "Moral Realism and Explanatory Necessity", David
Zimmerman suggests that moral realism is not quite
analogous to other sorts of realism. He proposes to
alter Dummett's formulation to suit the purposes of
ethics by replacing "epistemic recognition conditions"
with "motivational acceptance conditions", "because that
is where the central controversies about justification
in ethics lie." [14] It seems a reasonable move, since
it seems reasonable to suppose that the issues connected
with moral realism are not just issues about evidence,
but primarily issues about justification of other
kinds. Zimmerman says
14
The intuitive idea is that moral reflection and
judgment are a matter of discovery rather
than invention, projection, or self-discovery,
because the good and the right are "in the world".
Whereas realism about numbers or physical objects
or theoretical entities is the view that the
ontology of statements about these things
transcends their epistemic recognition conditions,
moral realism is the view that the ontology of
moral statements transcends their motivational
acceptance conditions. [15]
Zimmerman does not explain "motivational acceptance
conditions", and I do not find Dummett using the
expression "recognition conditions". Dummett does say:
According to [the anti-realist interpretation]
,
the
meanings of statements of the class in question are
given to us, not in terms of the conditions under
which these statements are true or false, conceived
of as conditions which obtain or do not obtain
independently of our knowledge or capacity for
knowledge, but in terms of the conditions which we
recognise as establishing the truth or falsity of
statements of that class. [16]
But Zimmerman clearly does not mean the result of
substituting "accept" for "recognise" in this passage.
I guess Zimmerman means to say that, for the moral anti-
realist, the meaning of a moral statement is "given in
15
t©nns of” th© conditions und©r which som©on© would
accept th© statement; and that the acceptance conditions
are "motivational" because the relevant kind of
acceptance is some kind of attitude that includes
motivation - someone who accepts, in this sense, a given
statement is motivated to act in a certain way. The
moral realist, then, holds that the meaning of a moral
statement does not include its acceptance conditions:
MR6 (s) (s is a moral statement > the meaning of s
does not include the conditions under which someone
would accept s)
.
The proposal seems well enough suited to excluding
noncognitivist theories, which typically do give the
meanings of moral statements in terms of a motivating
attitude - approval, disapproval, desire - that someone
who accepts the statement must have. But Zimmerman
takes anti-realism to include much more:
There is a class of meta-ethical theories that
reduce the good and the right to subjective stances
of various kinds. Examples are noncognitivist
theories like emotivism and prescriptivism, but
also naturalist theories like Harman's reduction of
certain "oughts" to a commitment to social
conventions; Brandt's reduction of rightness to the
set of rules that would be selected by a person
16
whose desires would survive cognitive purification;
Firth's analysis of "right" in terms of the
responses of an ideal observer; and perhaps Rawls's
account of value as the object of desires that
satisfy the constraints of deliberative
rationality. Opposed to these is the ontological
conviction that the truth conditions of moral
statements are essentially independent of
subjective stances, and that the nature of the good
and the right can be explicated without any
reference to what moral agents or judges approve or
are able to commit themselves to or desire. Call
this opposing conviction moral realism. [17]
It is not so clear how MR6 succeeds with the
naturalistic theories Zimmerman lists. Perhaps we can
understand Brandt's theory, for example, as saying that
something like "would desire p if cognitively purified"
gives the acceptance conditions for "p is right"
,
and
that these acceptance conditions give the meaning of the
statement, but I'm not sure I see exactly how this would
go.
The situation is worse when we consider more
primitive kinds of naturalism, according to which "p is
right" means "p is permitted by conventions of the
agent's society", say, or "x is good" means "someone
wants x" . Motivational acceptance conditions just don't
figure in these analyses. The analyses do involve
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motivating attitudes, but not motivating attitudes that
must be had by people who accept the statement in
question. Zimmerman evidently does want to count such
theories as anti-realist. His initial description is
that moral realism is "the ontological conviction that
the truth conditions of moral statements are essentially
independent of subjective stances." It won't do to say
the realist holds "that the nature of the good and the
right can be explicated without any reference to what
moral agents or judges approve of...", since Moore, at
least, was a realist who denied that the nature of the
good can be explicated, with or without any reference to
anything. Nor can we simply say:
MR7 (s) (s is a moral statement > the meaning of s
does not include reference to subjective stances)
since, on any theory, some moral statements are about
subjective stances - "You should love your neighbor.",
for example. The idea must be that the meanings of the
moral terms don't involve subjective stances.
This idea might be made out in various ways.
Richard Brandt has tried one way:
Let us say that a metaethical theory is mentalist
if and only if its view of ethical terms is such
that every ethical statement implies something
about minds - either that there is at least one
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mind, or that it is true of minds that they do
behave in some way or would behave in some way if
there were any. Contrariwise, a metaethical theory
is realist if its view of ethical terms is such
that no such implication follows from ethical
statements. [ 18 ]
Brandt's definition is not a success. It excludes from
the realist side any theories which hold that moral
statements must be about moral agents (all of whom,
presumably, have minds) although a number of theories
widely regarded as realist theories do hold this.
Warren Quinn gives a more sophisticated version of
the same idea in "Moral and Other Realisms: Some Initial
Difficulties". Quinn intends to formulate a
distinction general enough to serve various fields where
controversies arise about "the connection between
certain features we attribute to objects and certain
mental responses that somehow or other provide a basis
for these attributions;" for example, moral goodness and
moral approval, funniness and amusement, and something's
being red and its looking red:
What makes these and many other examples
controversial is the fact that one kind of
philosopher (the realist ) finds it plausible to
claim first that whether an object possesses one or
another of these features is independent of and
prior to the question whether it provokes the
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coiT3r©l3.tIV© ^©spons© ©nd s©cond th©t th© ir©spons©
its©lf is a g©nuin©ly cognitiv© stat© of mind in
som© way dir©ct©d to th© f©atur© as its obj©ct.
Whil© anoth©r kind of philosoph©r (th© m©ntalist )
finds it plausibl© to d©ny both th©s© claims and to
assort instoad that th© rospons© has concoptual
priority ov©r th© f©atur© and that what th© roalist
tak©s in th© rospons© as a f©atur© is r©ally som©
noncognitiv© attitud©, disposition, sonsation, or
act of will. In oth©r words, th© roalist rogards
th© rospons© as a rospons© th© f©atur© whil© th©
montalist s©©s th© f©atur© as som© sort of
construction out of th© rospons©. [19]
I think th© contral claim, as applied to th© moral cas©,
is that moral realism is this:
MRS (1) Moral responses are cognitiv© states of
mind directed to moral features, and (2) moral
features are not constructed out of moral
responses
.
My chief complaint about Quinn's proposal is that
it is obscure at a couple of crucial points. On© kind
of obscurity ©merges when w© try to apply MRS to
Brentano's theory that th© "source of our concepts of
th© good and th© bad" is "correct love": "W© call a
thing good when th© love relating to it is correct. In
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the broadest sense of the term, the good is that which
is worthy of being loved with a love that is correct."
[20] This appears to be an attempt to define goodness
in terms of a certain correlative response. Yet I think
most people with intuitions about the matter would call
Brentano a realist. It may be that we shouldn't call
him a realist - that the theory seems realist only as
long as we fail to think of the connection between value
and correct love as a construction (and maybe it isn't
intended as a construction but rather as an epistemic
criterion)
.
Quinn might say Brentano' s view realist
and is a construction but a construction out of a
cognitive response. The trouble is that Quinn declines
to explain the distinction between cognitive and
noncognitive responses. He alludes to Plato's
distinction between "rational" and "nonrational"
,
Hume's
distinction between "judgments" and "passions", then
proposes to "note that it is hard to see how philosophy
could do without such a distinction and to see how far
we can go by appealing to our intuitive sense of it."
[21] My intuitive sense of it fails as soon as it turns
to "correct love". It may be that this reveals a kind
of incoherence in Brentano 's concept - that he's trying
to have it both cognitive and not, but I think it also
reveals that the intuitive sense on which Quinn wants us
to rely does not go far enough.
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Another puzzle is about hedonism. Some hedonistic
theories analyse value in terms of pleasure, while
*^th.ers claim there is a nonanalytic connection between
the two. Does MRS have the result that those theories
which purport to analyse, but not the others, are non-
realist? If pleasure is a response correlative to
goodness, then analytic hedonism is non-realist on MRS.
Aside from saying the correlative response will "somehow
or other provide a basis for these attributions" [of the
feature], all Quinn says about the topic is: "Note that
R. Brandt in Ethical Theory correlates ethical features
and responses by means of the following principle: '...a
'corresponding' attitude is the attitude someone
justifiably has if some ethical statement is properly
asserted by him. ' But for present purposes (mainly to
avoid begging guestions in setting up the problem) I
prefer to leave the principles of correlation
undefined." [22] Pleasure fails to be correlated with
value according to Brandt's suggestion - even hedonists
do not claim that everyone who asserts an ethical
statement properly is pleased, but hedonism does seem to
imply that pleasure "somehow or other provides a basis
for" attributions of value.
MRS, then, gives no clear answer about hedonism. I
don't claim to know what the right answer is. On the
one hand, the two kinds of hedonism are on opposite
sides of one important ethical controversy - one but not
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the other is a form of naturalism. On the other hand,
that controversy seems not to be the one on which we
have been trying to focus, and other forms of naturalism
(those which analyse value in terms of non-mental
things) are classified realist by MRS.
Finally, there is a problem that is easier to see
in the perceptual than in the ethical case. One
possible kind of theory about the connection between
"being red" and "looking red" is that for something to
be red is for it to have the physical properties that
actually make things look red under ordinary
conditions. These are not theories according to which
the reference of "red" is fixed by appeal to "looks red"
(though it might be claimed that even according to the
latter kind of theory conceptual priority goes to
looking red) but rather theories purporting to analyse
"being red" this way. Such theories do make the
response conceptually prior to the corresponding
feature, do seem to construct the feature out of the
response, though, once again, I don't know whether the
response is cognitive of the feature. Would a theory
like this be mentalist? It would have "being red"
objective in at least this way: it would imply that if
our perceptual apparatus or perceptual conditions were
to change so that cherries looked blue, they would be
red cherries looking blue; while if certain physical
properties of the cherries were to change, they would
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cease to be red (however they then looked)
. Since a
number of recent arguments about moral realism (both for
and against) have turned on the fine points of various
analogies between evaluative properties and secondary
qualities [23], it would be better to have a criterion
of realism quite clear on this matter.
Let's take stock. On all accounts, moral realism
excludes noncognitivism. On some accounts it excludes
only noncognitivism. These aren't particularly
troublesome.
One kind of trouble arrives with accounts intended
also to exclude other theories. For these, the results
often don't match the intentions, and neither intentions
nor results match among different accounts.
One major source of confusion is in the place of
epistemic elements. Of the partly epistemic accounts,
some simply hold that moral realism must be anti-
skeptical - must affirm some possibility of moral
knowledge. By contrast, on the more Dummettian view
that realists take even unknowable moral statements to
be true or false, moral realism is compatible with moral
skepticism. The latter views seem to make no claim at
all about moral epistemology, but rather attempt to
specify an ontological position by means of an
epistemically-based theory of meaning. Of course, some
writers combine the two approaches [24].
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Then there are the attempts to characterise moral
realism in a way that excludes some or all forms of what
I have loosely been calling "subjectivism". Of course,
"subjectivism" has problems of its own, even more in
ethics than elsewhere since, in addition to the people
evaluating a statement, ethical contexts often provide
an extra candidate ~ the agent ~ for being the relevant
"subject". My use of the term has precedent at least in
G.E. Moore's "The Conception of Intrinsic Value". After
calling the term "desperately ambiguous", he proposes to
use it in this sense:
Thus anyone who holds that when we say that a thing
is beautiful, what we mean is merely that we
ourselves or some particular class of people do, or
would under certain circumstances, have, or
permanently have, a certain feeling towards the
thing in question, is taking a "subjective" view of
beauty. [25]
Moore's initial concern in that paper is to show
that interest in the controversy between subjectivism
and objectivism in ethics is misplaced interest that
belongs properly to the issue of naturalism. He finds
it obvious that the fundamental objection against
subjectivist theories is that "On any 'subjective'
interpretation, the very same kind of thing which, under
some circumstances is better than another, would under
others be worse." And he points out that that objection
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goes just as well against objectivist naturalism,
against, for example, the "evolutionary" theory that
"better" means "better fitted to survive". [26]
Conversely, he claims that many defenders of
subjectivism defend it because it is "naturalistic or
positivistic". [27]
I'm inclined to think Moore is right about the
defenders of subjectivism, though less clearly right
about the main objection against it. But we might
reject Moore's particular claims and still accept the
methodological lesson: fundamental ethical categories
are the ones induced by fundamental ethical arguments.
So I think that whether some kind of moral realism
is a fundamental ethical category turns on whether there
are fundamental arguments dividing noncognitivism and
some or all kinds of subjectivism (and perhaps error
theories) on the one hand, from nonnaturalism and other
forms of naturalism on the other. But I know of no such
arguments
.
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CHAPTER 2
EXTREME UNIVERSAL MORAL REALISM
In "Moral Realisms and Moral Dilemmas", Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong argues that "moral dilemmas do show
that extreme universal moral realism is false", [l] He
takes some pains to specify precisely the position he
calls "extreme universal moral realism". But there is
a point to arguing against a position only if it has
some plausibility or some defenders. I wish to urge
that, quite without recourse to anything as
controversial as moral dilemmas, just about everyone
can reject this one - it is a position occupied by none
of the theories generally regarded as most clearly
versions of moral realism. [2]
Sinnott-Armstrong identifies "extreme universal moral
realism" by saying:
I will call the truth conditions of a moral
judgment realistic only if whether or not they
hold is independent of the actual and ideal moral
beliefs and choices of the person judged and of
the person who makes the judgment. A moral
judgment is then realistic just in case its truth
conditions are realistic. A moral theory is a
version of moral realism only if it claims that
every moral judgment is realistic. Thus moral
realism is the claim that some moral judgments are
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true and every moral judgment is true if and only
if ^®^tain conditions hold which are independent
of the actual and ideal moral beliefs and choices
of the judger and the judged, [p. 264]
I will sometimes call this claim "EUMR". We are to
understand "independent" according to this definition:
To say that moral judgments or their truth values
depend on certain mental states is to say that
necessarily, the truth values of those judgments
would change if the mental states changed in
relevant ways but other factors remained the same,
[p. 263]
Let's begin by considering the moral judgment:
(Jl) Jane ought not to have the moral beliefs she
actually has.
According to at least some prominent moral theories
ordinarily classified as versions of moral realism, the
truth value of this judgment depends on, among other
things, Jane's moral beliefs. We can imagine the
situation as being one in which a utilitarian would
defend (Jl) by saying that Jane's moral beliefs make
her feel guilty and miserable, and perhaps also nasty
and maleficent, while other moral beliefs she could
have instead would make her happier and nicer. We can
imagine a situation in which a Kantian would accept
(Jl) because Jane wouldn't want everyone to share her
moral beliefs (if she happens to be an egoist, say). A
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Christian might think she should believe something more
in keeping with the teachings of Christ. in fact, it's
hard to see how any theory could have (Jl) independent
of Jane's moral beliefs. So it's hard to see how any
theory could qualify as a version of extreme universal
moral realism.
In case someone wants to deny that Jane is able to
change her moral beliefs, we could change the example:
(J2) Jane ought not to give money to people who share
her moral beliefs.
It should be clear that we can tell stories similar to
the ones above to establish that (J2) depends on Jane's
moral beliefs - the others with those moral beliefs
might be just the ones who would put her money to
nefarious uses.
Although Sinnott-Armstrong' s definition of
"depend" is not easy to interpret (since the force of
"necesarily" is drastically diminished by the proviso
that "other factors remain the same")
,
he shouldn't
deny that these are cases of dependence in his sense.
The utilitarian, for example, is claiming that there
are ways in which Jane's beliefs might change (for the
more benign) such that, necessarily, if they changed in
those ways, and other factors (particularly the
consequences of having various moral beliefs) stayed
the same, then (Jl) would be false.
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(Jl) is, of course, a peculiar sort of moral
judgment, explicitly referring as it does to moral
beliefs. Sinnott-Armstrong might want to make an
exception of it on some such grounds. But once we've
got the point about (Jl)
,
we are in a position to
appreciate less exceptional cases. The point is,
roughly, that moral beliefs can have consequences and
histories, they can be parts of other beliefs, conflict
with other beliefs, and more - I am tempted to say,
"Moral beliefs are real." Thus dependence (in Sinnott-
Armstrong' s sense) on them indicates nothing anti-
realistic about a moral theory.
Suppose now that Jill believes lying is morally
wrong. Suppose also that Jill's telling a lie would
have no valuable or harmful consequences other than
some unhappiness incurred by Jill because she believes
herself to have done something morally wrong. Again,
it seems natural for a utilitarian to say:
(J3) Jill ought not to tell a lie
is true, but, necessarily, if Jill did not have this
moral belief, and other factors remained the same, (J3)
would be false.
Or consider Joyce, who believes the wearing of
zippers is wicked, and wants people not to behave
wickedly (maybe because she fears divine retribution
for widespread wickedness, maybe for no particular
reason) . A Kantian might say: Joyce cannot
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consistently will that the maxim of her action be a
universal law, so
(J4) Joyce ought not to wear zippers.
true, but its truth depends on Joyce ^s moral view
about zippers. So Sinnott-Armstrong's definition has it
that some rather ordinary utilitarian and Kantian
judgments fail to be realistic.
This brings us rather close to the case Sinnott-
Armstrong presents as the core of his argument against
extreme universal moral realism: Jim and Jack face
very similar "moral dilemmas". Each has made a promise
to a colleague that he can keep only by causing pain to
his daughter. For each, the conflicting moral
requirements "might be described as equal or
incomparable" and the dilemmas are alike "in all
respects that could be morally relevant according to
moral realism". The only morally relevant difference
is that Jim "chooses to be a family man committed to a
family way of life" while Jack "chooses to be a
professional man committed to a professional way of
life" [p. 267]. Sinnott-Armstrong's verdict is that
Jim should break his promise because "to choose
otherwise would show a lack of integrity on his part",
while Jack, for the same reason, should keep his
promise. So, as Sinnott-Armstrong sees it, there is a
difference in moral judgment without any difference in
realistic moral factors.
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Let's consider how this case differs from the ones
I described above. Significant differences might yield
a clue toward an improved formulation of EUKR. [3]
The reader may have noticed that, in the cases of
(Jl) and (J2)
,
the moral beliefs on which the judgment
depends are not beliefs about it - about that judgment,
while in the case of Jack and Jim, the judgments depend
on moral choices which presumably imply beliefs about
the very judgments in question. But this does not
serve to distinguish the Jack-and-Jim case from the
cases of Jill and Joyce ((J3) and (J4)), where the
judgments do depend on beliefs about these judgments
themselves
.
It might be said that in the cases I have
presented the judgments depend only indirectly, by way
of various consequences and other beliefs and other
circumstances, on moral attitudes, while in the case of
Jack and Jim (and generally, according to anti-
realists) the dependence is direct and immediate - acts
are made morally right (or wrong) directly by someone's
thinking they are. Notice, however, that even in
Sinnott-Armstrong' s story the judgment that Jim should
break his promise is not immediately made true by
Jim's beliefs. Sinnott-Armstrong' s is a longish story,
involving the circumstance that Jim's keeping his
promise conflicts with his commitment to the family way
of life, and the fact that this commitment does not
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"depend on any error, ignorance, irrationality or
partiality" and that the commitment is not "morally
wrong" because Jim is not "so committed to his way of
life that he would violate a realistically overriding
moral requirement in order to further his family."
[p. 268]
In the cases I have discussed, the realist
theories accord no special status to the moral
attitudes of judges or judged - what Sinnott-Armstrong
calls "personal factors". These theories treat
personal factors as factors among others on which the
judgments depend - moral attitudes of people who are
neither judge nor judged, and factors that are not
attitudes at all. For instance, (J3) depends not just
on Jill's beliefs but also on the absence of
significant consequences beyond Jill's happiness. On
most views, there are ways this circumstance could
change (suppose Jill's lying would halt the spread of
AIDS) such that, necessarily, if other factors remained
the same, (J3) would be false. But Sinnott-Armstrong
can hardly claim that anti-realistic judgments depend
only on moral attitudes of judger and judged. His
judgments about Jack and Jim would, then, not count as
anti-realistic - they too depend on things other than
moral commitments - notably on the perfect balance of
"realistic" moral factors. It would, I think, take an
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extreme anti-realist to claim that any moral judgments
depend only on moral attitudes.
A different kind of problem is this: take any
realistic moral theory, T, that entails no theory of
moral knowledge, and add to it this unlikely bit of
moral epistemology; some people have perfect moral
intuitions about some judgments — they accept them when
and only when they're true. Call the resultant theory -
complete with epistemic component - "T*". If Jennifer
has perfect intuition about a judgment, j*, then j*
will, in Sinnott-Armstrong' s sense, be dependent on
Jennifer's beliefs: necessarily, if Jennifer's belief
about j* were to change, but other factors (including
the accuracy of her intuition) were to stay the same,
the truth value of j* would change. So T* is debarred
by Sinnott-Armstrong' s account from being an extremely
universally realistic theory.
This must be wrong. Of course the epistemic claim
is implausible, and T* is thereby made implausible.
Perhaps the conjunction of the epistemic claim with a
realistic theory is even more implausible than would be
its conjunction with certain kinds of anti-realism.
But I see no reason to think that T* must be made
impossible or incoherent or anti-realistic by its
epistemic component. Since an adeguate account of what
moral realism is must cover not only plausible
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realistic theories but all possible versions of moral
realism, this impugns the adequacy of EUMR.
EUMR fails also in the other direction - it counts
as realistic certain judgments more naturally
classified as anti-realistic. Consider what we might
call "societal relativism" - theories according to
which it is not individual beliefs that make moral
judgments true, but rather the moral beliefs generally
accepted in a society. Most judgments made by such a
theory would depend on moral beliefs of neither judger
nor judged but on moral beliefs of some larger group.
So on EUMR they are realistic judgments. Yet such
theories belong with individual relativisms, not with
realistic theories.
Furthermore, typical noncognitivist theories
analyse moral judgments not as depending on beliefs or
choices, but in terms of non-doxastic attitudes which
aren't exactly choices - desires, prescriptions, and so
on. Typically, these theories assign no truth
conditions to moral judgments, so Sinnott-Armstrong may
have them nonrealistic on that score. Still, it seems
odd to single out beliefs and choices. Thus EUMR is
not just too extreme - even a more moderate variant
would share these problems.
Sinnott-Armstrong concludes that "Extreme moral
realism underestimates the complexity of moral life
when it overlooks the importance of individual choices
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and moral beliefs in moral dilemmas." [p. 276] But
moral realists can perfectly well admit that these
things are as important as anything else. Whether
moral attitudes can enter into moral judgments in the
same way that every other kind of factor can enter into
moral judgments strikes me as having nothing to do with
the issues usually taken to divide moral realism from
sriti—realism. What might bear on these issues would be
a claim that there is some special way that only
certain attitudes can enter into moral judgments. [5]
NOTES
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2. I am supposing that utilitarianism, followed
closely by Kantianism, is the most uncontroversially
realistic of the major moral theories. I mean here a
sort of generic utilitarianism (and Kantianism)
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metametaethics)
,
we cannot consider the application of
39
Sinnott-Armstrong's definitions to particular judgments
without invoking particular normative theories.
3 . I mean to concede only for the sake of argument
that Sinnott-Armstrong's case shows something anti-
realistic. It seems to me realists can accommodate
Sinnott-Armstrong's intuition about the case by holding
that violation of a person's integrity is a bad thing.
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CHAPTER 3
RAILTON'S MORAL REALISM
Peter Railton offers what he calls "a substantive
theory" under the title "Moral Realism", in fact, a
theory he claims "might well be called 'stark, raving
moral realism'." [1] Since the theory is also supposed
to be naturalistic, it may be worthwhile to see whether
there is anything about it that might appropriately be
called "realistic".
The advantage of this theory is supposed to be that
it combines the empirical attractions of naturalism -
making evaluative knowledge "of a piece with" empirical
science and providing an explanatory role for moral
concepts - with the "normative force" generally thought
accessible only to objectivist theories. It is to be "a
plausible synthesis of the empirical and the normative",
[p. 163] I don't dispute that Railton's theory has the
empirical advantages, but I think it is seriously
lacking at the other end.
Although he finally sketches a theory of moral
rightness, what he gives in detail, and uses as both
foundation and model for the moral theory, is a theory
of "non-moral goodness for an individual".
The account begins with "the notion of someone's
subjective interests - his wants or desires, conscious
or unconscious." [p. 173] Subjective interests can.
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Railton says, "be seen as a secondary quality, akin to
taste" and "as a secondary quality" it "supervenes on" a
"reduction basis" consisting of "primary qualities of
the perceiver, the object (or other phenomenon)
perceived, and the surrounding context." [p. 173]
Though he supposes this is "an objective notion that
corresponds to and helps explain, subjective interests"
he admits that it is "not a plausible foundation for the
notion of non-moral goodness, since the subjective
interests it grounds have insufficient normative force
to capture the idea of desirableness." [p. 173] So
there are two more stages. First, "the notion of an
objectified subjective interest for an individual A"
:
Give to an actual individual A unqualified
cognitive and imaginative powers, and full factual
and nomological information about his physical and
psychological contstitution, capacities, history,
and so on. A will have become A+, who has complete
and vivid knowledge of himself and his environment,
and whose instrumental rationality is in no way
defective. We now ask A+ to tell us not what
currently wants, but what he would want his non-
idealized self A to want - or, more generally, to
seek - were he to find himself in the actual
condition and circumstances of A. [pp. 173-4]
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As for subjective interests, Railton assumes there is a
reduction basis for objectified subjective interests [p.
174] and claims that this reduction basis "makes it be
the case that" the individual has a certain objective
interest. [He seems not to identify the objective
interest with the reduction basis. In fact, he suggests
the objective interest has a reduction basis [p. 176]
though he doesn't say whether the reduction basis the
objective interest has is the same as the reduction
basis that "makes it be the case that" the individual
has the objective interest, which, recall, is the
reduction basis of the objectified subjective interest.]
Finally, Railton says "x is non-morally good for A
if and only if x would satisfy an objective interest of
A." [p. 176]
Having described various items as "objectified" and
"objective", Railton only once gives explicitly a hint
of what he thereby means to say about them:
Although relational, the relevant facts about
humans and their world are objective in the same
sense that such non-relational entities as stones
are: they do not depend for their existence or
nature merely upon our conception of them. [p. 183]
The evaluative concepts he calls "objective" are, I
guess, objective in this sense, but then the interests
he calls "subjective" are also objective in this sense -
our wants or desires do not depend on our conception of
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them for their existence or nature. (Our unconscious
desires, especially, could hardly be claimed so to
depend.
)
Is there, then, some serious kind of objectivity
Railton can attribute to individual non-moral value?
There are moves toward two things that might seem to
deserve to be called "objectivity" among the various
stages of his account. The move to the reduction basis
of subjective interests is already supposed to yield an
"objective notion", presumably because the reduction
basis contains "primary qualities". The step to
objectified subjective interests must be another kind of
objectification - a move away from the vagaries of
actual desires. Individual non-moral value, then, is
supposed to be objective both ways.
The first move, to the "reduction basis", seems to
me not to achieve any very high degree of objectivity.
By Railton 's admission, it involves not only properties
of the object valued but also various "relational,
dispositional" properties of the "perceiver" and the
"surrounding context". Although he calls the reduction
basis "a constellation of primary qualities", its
relation to the alleged secondary qualities is not one
of those standardly though to hold between a secondary
quality and its objective foundation - those primary
qualities, I would have thought, are (nonrelational)
primary qualities of the object .
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What about the second move - from the desires of an
actual individual to the desires of his idealized self?
I do not want to insist that an idealized subject is
still a subject, and his desires are as subjective as
any others, though there may be philosophers who would
so insist. What I find worth remarking is that, though
the idealized individual's desires are independent of
some desires of the actual individual, they are not
independent of all the actual desires. For once the
idealized individual has exercised his superlative
cognitive and imaginative and rational powers about all
the relevant information, it remains for him to make a
choice among the alternatives he so vividly and fully
and clearly apprehends. And it's hard to see what other
basis he could have for his choice than the preferences
he shares with his non-idealized self - that is, some of
the actual preferences of the actual individual. So,
although this move may be in the direction of a serious
kind of objectivity, it doesn't seem to get all the way
there
.
In fact, Railton's account is incompatible with
there being objective interests, or objective non-moral
individual value. To see this, we may consider first
whether my idealized self would want me to want to win
Megabucks were she in the actual conditions and
circumstances of me. My idealized self, we may suppose,
knows my winning is exceedingly unlikely (perhaps she
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even knows I won't win - it's not clear how far full
information goes here)
. She knows also that there are
costs to my wanting to win Megabucks - it might make me
buy a lot of tickets, or it might just make me
frustrated. Furthermore, she knows my wanting to win
would have no beneficial side effects - it's not one of
those aspirations that would impel me to accomplish
things, the hope of winning wouldn't lift my spirits,
etc. . Under these circumstances, my idealized self would
hardly be a friend of mine if she wanted me to want to
win. It doesn't follow from any of this that winning
wouldn't be good for me.
Now it seems obvious that if there are things
objectively good for me at all, some of them might be
relevantly like winning Megabucks - that is, they're so
unavailable to me that the costs of my wanting them
outweigh any benefits. So my idealized self wouldn't
want me to want them; so they would not be good for me
by Railton's definition. For similar reasons, there
might be things bad for me though my wanting of them
would be good. Railton's cannot, then, be a correct
account of an objective concept of individual value.
There remains the matter of "normative force"
.
Railton's claims to objectivity for his evaluative
concepts are mainly intended to support the claim that
these have the proper normative force. So it may be
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worth considering whether there is independent
justification for the latter claim.
According to Railton, showing that the definitions
capture the proper normative force "involves showing
that the definitions permit plausible connections to be
drawn between, on the one hand, what is good or right
and, on the other, what characteristically would
motivate individuals who are prepared to submit
themselves to relevant sorts of scrutiny." [p. 205 ]
In the case of non-moral individual value, he says
his account provides this link with motivation:
Suppose that one desires X but wonders whether X
really is part of one's good. This puzzlement
typically arises because one feels that one knows
too little about X, oneself, or one's world, or
because one senses that one is not being adequately
rational or reflective in assessing the information
one has.... were one to learn that when fully
informed and rational one would want oneself not to
want X in the circumstances, this presumably would
add force to it. Desires being what they are, a
reinforced worry might not be sufficient to remove
the desire for X. But if one were to become
genuinely and vividly convinced that one's desire
for X is in this sense not supported by full
reflection upon the facts, one presumably would
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feel this to be a count against acting upon the
desire, [pp. 177-178]
So it seems the normative force Railton ascribes to
his concept of non-moral individual value amounts to
this: if vividly convinced that something fails to be
good in his sense, we would feel this to be a count
against acting on the desire for it.
I'm not sure he is entitled even to this much.
Having a desire is not the same as acting on it. As far
as I can tell, I might perfectly well have a desire I
know to be bad for me yet not be at all deterred by this
knowledge from acting on it. In particular, this could
happen if I were to know that it would be the wanting
rather than the getting that would be bad for me. I
might, for example, want to lose ten pounds. My
idealized self and I might both know the desire will do
me no good - it won't keep me from eating cookies, it
will just keep me from enjoying them. But none of this
counts even a little against my acting on the desire,
maybe by giving up the cookies, especially given that
I'm not likely to get rid of the desire.
Furthermore, even if Railton were right that the
failure of X to be in his sense good for me would count
against my acting on my desire for X, this relation to
motivation would be one his concept of value shares with
the concept of possibility : my becoming vividly
convinced that an object of my desires fails to be
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possible would surely count against my acting on the
desire. Possibility, l take it, is not among the
notably evaluative properties - any force it has does
not deserve to be called "normative force"
.
I conclude that Railton has not synthesized the
empirical and the normative. If, as he suggests,
realism requires the normative, he has not made a case
for his theory's being even moderately realistic. This
is, in part, because he has insufficiently heeded the
observation of the Rolling Stones: you can't always get
what you want.
Note
1. The Philosophical Review
, 95 (1986) pp. 163-207, p.
165. Numbers in suare brackets in the rest of this
chapter refer to pages in the same article.
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CHAPTER 4
QUASI-REALISM
In "What difference Does It Make Whether Moral Realism
Is True?" [1] Nicholas Sturgeon argues that there are
significant differences between realist and nonrealist moral
theories - differences not restricted to the metaphysical
and epistemological issues that typically motivate non-
realist theories. [2] Much of Sturgeon's paper is directed
against Simon Blackburn's "quasi-realist" program, which,
"starting from a recognizably anti-realist position," is,
according to Blackburn, "able to mimic the intellectual
practices supposedly definitive of realism." [3]
Sturgeon's most direct and detailed attack against
Blackburn involves the claim that "only a moral realist can
be a genuine fallibilist" [4]. A genuine moral fallibilist
is someone who holds that any of his moral views "might in
principle be mistaken" [5]. Fallibilism, according to
Sturgeon, "has seemed to many philosophers an important and
attractive form of epistemological modesty" without which,
he suggests, noncognitivists in particular should be
embarrassed to be caught [6].
I think Sturgeon is wrong about the particular need of
noncognitivists to embrace genuine fallibilism. He points
out that noncognitivists have thought they were fallibilist
enough in admitting they might be mistaken about the
nonmoral facts implied by their moral attitudes. But this
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noncognitivist fallibilism isn't genuine fallibilism - that
requires the possibility of properly moral mistakes.
Because noncognitivism is defended by appeal to an is-ought
gap, Sturgeon says, noncognitivists should insist that "even
if we have all the nonmoral facts right, and reason in
accord with whatever a priori constraints may apply, there
is still room for error when we go on to draw moral
conclusions." [7] (This being, he says, the "most
attractive" way to understand the is-ought doctrine.) While
it may be the most attractive way for realists to understand
that doctrine, there is an alternative reading obviously
more attractive to noncognitivists, namely, that even if we
have the nonmoral facts and reasoning right, no moral
attitude is thereby uniquely supported. To insist that
there must be "further room for mistake" is to suppose there
are moral facts about which mistakes are possible, and so to
beg the question against the noncognitivists, who need only
hold there is room for a plurality of attitudes none more
correct than the rest.
Though noncognitivists have no special need for genuine
fallibilism, they might want it anyway; and they might think
they are able to have it. Blackburn has explicitly claimed
that "quasi-realists" are able to have it.
The device he uses in support of this claim is the one
he uses also to construct various other aspects of realistic
behavior (talk about moral truth, moral knowledge, and
conditionals with moral components) : the idea of assessing
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moral sensibilities
.
A moral sensibility, Blackburn says,
is "a tendency to seek, wish for, admire, emulate, desire,
things according to some other features which one believes
them to possess." [8] In another place he says a moral
sensibility "is defined by a function from input of belief
to output of attitude." [9]
The important point is that we may admire some of these
sensibilities more than we admire others of them, and we
might not admire our own most of all: "We could learn that
we come to admire things too often because of propensities
which we regard as inferior: insensitivities, fears, blind
traditions, failures of knowledge, imagination, sympathy.
In this way we can turn our judgments on our own appetitive
construction, and may find it lacking. The projection of
this possibility is simply the expression of fallibility."
[10] Thus, Blackburn claims, attitudes "perfectly
accessible to the emotivist" give him "all that is needed
for a concept of an improvement or a deterioration in his
own moral stance. He can go beyond saying "I might change"
to saying "I might improve." For he can back up the
possibility by drawing the change as one which from his own
standpoint he would admire." [11]
I take it that on the guasi-realist proposal, "I might
be mistaken about x." is rendered "I have a certain attitude
toward x but there might be a sensibility I admire (at least
as much as I admire my own) that includes a different (and
incompatible) attitude toward x."
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Notice that I might come to believe I was mistaken about
X otherwise than by reflecting directly about x and my
^^i-itude toward it. I might, for example, know someone
evidently more sensitive and imaginative than I am, whose
attitude toward x I discover to be incompatible with mine
(where we assume that sensitivity and imaginativeness are
the qualities most important in making a sensibility one I
admire). Notice also that, on this proposal, I might be
mistaken in one of my attitudes without ever coming to
believe I'm mistaken. Evaluation of a sensibility can
depend not only on evaluation of the attitudes it includes
but also on evaluation of various of its contingent
properties. These features make quasi-realism intriguingly
more complex than traditional noncognitivist theories.
Sturgeon objects that this way of having fallibilism
collapses "a distinction which realists and noncognitivists
alike have found crucial, especially in defending
consequential ist moral theories” [12] namely, "the
distinction between refuting a moral opinion and showing
that its acceptance would have bad consequences." [13]
Consequential ist quasi-realists. Sturgeon claims, cannot
have this distinction "For I assume that when thoroughgoing
consequentialists engage in moral assessment of moral
sensibilities, they will do so (how else?) by appeal to
consequences. The best moral sensibility to have will be
the one, the having of which would lead to the best
consequences." [14]
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That is, we, especially if we're consequential ists, need
at least two ways of assessing moral opinions: one that
bears on their refutation and one that bears on the moral
status of their acceptance. But Blackburn's device of
assessing moral opinions by assessing sensibilities seems to
give us only one way - the wrong one.
Or so it may seem. But it should be obvious that there
are many ways we might assess moral sensibilities, even if
we are consequentialists
. Indeed, I don't see that a
thoroughgoing consequentialist has particular reason to
evaluate moral sensibilities by the consequences of their
being had. The having of a moral sensibility isn't even
clearly an act, and, in any case, a number of different
(kinds of) acts involving a given sensibility seem no less
relevant to its evaluation than the having of it. My
admiring a given sensibility is not the same as my having
it, or as my choosing to have it, or as my writing books in
defense of it. I might admire one without being sympathetic
or imaginative enough to have it; I might have it but be
incapable of writing books in defense of anything; or I
might write the book for money and glory though I neither
have nor admire the sensibility the book defends. These
things may all have different consequences.
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Now, one kind of activity involving moral sensibilities
theoretical activity (I surmise that among really
thoroughgoing consequentialists, theorizing is the most
common among their activities involving moral
sensibilities)
.
Theorizing about moral opinions is the stuff moral
philosophers do (in their capacity as moral philosophers).
It includes describing conceptual connections among moral
opinions, formulating generalizations about them, and so
on. It's important for my purposes here that we can
understand "theorize" without saying anything about truth -
without, for instance, saying moral theorizing is activity
that aims to establish the truth (or falsity) of moral
opinions. I don't think we need to say this. Whatever
other problems they may have, there's no problem about our
recognizing as theorizing the activities of at least some
philosophers who deny they particularly aim for truth. [15]
A quasi-realist might, then, respond to Sturgeon's
objection by distinguishing the theoretical merit of a moral
sensibility from other kinds of merit it may have. [16]
Theoretical virtues are those apt to appear as virtues when
we theorize. Consistency, simplicity, fitting with the non-
moral facts, and not conflicting much with other reasonably
admirable moral sensibilities are features that will
generally make a moral sensibility theoretically admirable.
Indeed it seems that anything a realist might want to count
as evidence for the truth of a moral opinion might be
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counted by a quasi-realist as contributing to the
theoretical merit of moral sensibilities that include it.
The distinction is available to consequential ists too.
A theoretically admirable sensibility will be one the having
and defending of which in suitably academic circumstances
will have good results - particularly if the results are
evaluated in a suitably academic way (though it may be less
useful in other circumstances)
.
And the distinction enables consequentialist quasi-
realists to do what, according to Sturgeon, no quasi-realist
can do: "offer the natural explanation" of why we
distinguish between refuting a theory and showing its
acceptance would have bad consequences. It's not exactly
the distinction he has in mind (that refutation is a matter
of showing an opinion false ) but it's just as good an
explanation : refutation is a theoretical business, so it
stands to reason that theoretical assessment is what comes
into it.
So Sturgeon has failed to show that the quasi-realist's
version of fallibilism deprives him of the distinction
between refuting a theory and showing there is something
morally wrong about accepting that theory. Contrary to what
Sturgeon seems to suppose, that distinction, as well as
genuine fallibilism, can be made out without appeal to moral
truth
.
Nonetheless, Blackburn does claim he can "construct"
truth. [17] The simplest way for a quasi-ralist to do this.
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he says, is to identify true evaluations as members of the
"'best possible set of attitudes' thought of as the limiting
set which would result from taking all possible improvements
of attitude." [18]
Sturgeon objects that these definitions fail for just
the reason that the account of fallibilism fails: "For by
'improvement', here, the noncognitivist of course cannot
mean improvement in getting at the truth." [19] That is, he
supposes that improvement of a sensibility must be moral
improvement and infers that this kind of improvement need
not coincide with improvement in veracity.
But again, it's available to the quasi-realist (though,
again, Blackburn doesn't avail himself of it) to say there
are different kinds of improvement in attitude ( as there
are different respects in which one may admire a sensibility
- I may admire the effects of one, the causes of another,
the structure of one, the fine grain of another: there are
more than two attitudes I may have toward a sensibility)
.
So, again, the quasi-realist can point out that truth is
a concern primarily of theorists (and knowledge too) and
thus involves theoretical assessment of attitudes. Thus she
can say that true evaluations are the results of all
theoretical improvements in attitude.
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I have been trying to show that quasi-real ism can supply
creditable, if not particularly natural, replies to
Sturgeon's objections (though I don't say these are the only
answers a quasi-realist can give)
. But there is trouble
elsewhere for quasi-realism.
Blackburn's constructions appeal to a "best possible set
of attitudes"; the result of "taking all possible
improvements of attitude" ; attitudes such that "no improved
perspective yielding a revision is possible." But what he
initially introduced was crucially a relational concept of
improvement; "He can go beyond saying 'I might change' to
saying 'I might improve'. For he can back up the
possibility by drawing the change as one which from his own
standpoint he might admire." [my emphasis]. Where do the
standpoints drop out of the picture?
Blackburn does discuss what he calls "the deep problem
of relativism"; "the suspicion that other, equally
admirable sensibilities, over which I can claim no
superiority of my own, lead to divergent judgements." [21]
He thinks he has a solution. Given two divergent
sensibilities, he says, "Is someone who has either of the
two sensibilities aware of the other? If not, surely it
would be an improvement if he were." [22] From the
perspective of a sensibility thus improved, he suggests, we
can see that each of the original rival sensibilities is
flawed, and undertake some sort of reconciliation. Evidence
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of divergence between two sensibilities is evidence that
there is room for improvement in one or both rivals. [ 23 ]
But this story doesn't go through if we restrict
ourselves to the concept of improvement to which Blackburn
has laid claim. Suppose I'm a little dogmatic about my
sensibility. Suppose there is a rival sensibility in which
I find so little to admire that I want not to know much
about it. I may be aware that other people admire it, but
this isn't enough awareness for Blackburn's purpose. To
effect the reconciliation, he admits, he needs awareness to
the extent that I am "sensitive to the virtues" others find
in the alternative sensibility. And I may perfectly well
neither have nor want so extensive an awareness. it may be
my considered view that so much sensitivity would corrupt my
own sensibility. From the standpoint of my own current
sensibility, then, awareness of the other just doesn't count
as improvement. For that matter, it's not so obvious that
two rival sensibilities, each improved by sensitive
awareness of the other, would end up reconciled. [ 24 ]
It's hardly surprising that a concept built of
relational pieces cannot so easily be shown to be absolute.
If, as seems likely, it can't be shown absolute in other
ways either, there seem to remain two options for the quasi-
realist; he might settle for a concept of truth relativized
to sensibilities; or he might, at risk of being left with a
very small, perhaps empty, class of evaluative truths, take
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evaluations to be true only if true relative to all
sensibilities.
I'm not sure how damaging either concession would be to
the quasi-realist project. Perhaps we should not demand
that a construction preserve all the features standardly
associated with truth. At one point, Blackburn announces he
does "not greatly recommend the question" whether "moral
commitment is true or false in just the same sense in which
any other belief is" [25]; and he finally admits that it is
only if "we sympathize with the coherence gestalt-switch
which permits us to see all truth as constructed out of
membership of virtuous systems" that we will accept moral
truth as "just a kind of real truth" [26]. Sometimes he
seems to suppose that all (or almost all) it takes to be a
concept of truth is to be a concept of "success in
judgement" [27]. But this clearly won't do - there are too
many aims we might have in making (even ordinary non-
evaluative) judgments, thus too many kinds of possible
success. So it's not clear what is left of truth in the
quasi-realist version.
What, then, remains of the quasi-realist program? On
one occasion, Blackburn describes the program this way;
The issue is whether the projection is only explicable
if we mistake the origins of our evaluative practices.
The idea would be that were we aware of these origins we
would give up some or all of our tendency to practice as
if evaluative commitments had truth-conditions, and were
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not expressive in origin and in their essential nature.
But perhaps there is no mistake. l call the enterprise
of showing that there is none - that even on anti-
realist grounds there is nothing improper, nothing
"diseased" in projected predicates - the enterprise of
guasi-realism
. [28]
He means, I think, to claim that quasi-realism can preserve
not only moral talk "as though evaluations had truth-
conditions" but also something about what has come to be
known as the "phenomenology" of value [29]: he thinks quasi-
realism can answer the charge that evaluations can "matter"
only on a realist construal.
On one hand, Blackburn simply scoffs at the idea that
"things do not matter unless they matter to God, or
throughout infinity, or to a world conceived apart from any
particular set of concerns or desires, or whatever." He
says "One should not adjust one's metaphysics to pander to
such defects [in sensibility]." [30] On the other hand, he
seems to attach some importance to showing that quasi-
realism allows a certain "mind-independence" to evaluations.
This "mind-independence" is supposed to consist in the
falsity, on the quasi-realist account, of such sentences as
"If we had different sentiments, it would be right to kick
dogs." This falsity is supposed to result from the quasi-
realist treatment of sentences containing unasserted
evaluative components (a treatment Blackburn regards as a
central achievement) . Such sentences, of course, are to be
61
interpreted as about sensibilities. For example, "if it is
wrong to tell lies, it is wrong to get your little brother
to tell lies." IS to be taken as saying "a sensibility which
attitude of disapproval towards telling lies, and
an attitude of calm or approval towards getting your little
brother to tell lies, would not meet my endorsement." [31]
sentence about kicking dogs is, according to
Blackburn, false because it "endorses a certain sensibility:
one which lets information about what people feel dictate
its attitude to kicking dogs. But nice people do not
endorse such a sensibility. What makes it wrong to kick
dogs is the cruelty and pain to the animal. That input
should yield disapproval and indignation as output." [ 32 ]
Now, Blackburn has sketched an anlysis for conditionals
of which both antecedent and consequent are evaluative. But
it is by no means obvious how this is supposed to be
extended to cover conditionals with non-evaluative
antecedents, like
(D) If we had different sentiments, it would be right
to kick dogs.
(Notice that, to avoid irrelevant problems, we must
understand "if we had different sentiments" here, and in
what follows, as short for something like "if our sentiments
about kicking dogs were the opposite of what they in fact
are"
.
)
Blackburn assumes the quasi-realist interpretation of (D) to
be:
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(Dl) We endorse sensibilities which, if they included
the belief that we have different sensibilities,
would include approval of kicking dogs.
We may agree that (Dl) is false. But there are other
possible interpretations that seem to fit at least as well
as (Dl) does with the quasi-realist scheme, in particular:
(D2) If our sentiments were different, we would endorse
sensibilities which include approval of kicking
dogs.
and
(D3) We endorse sensibilities which, if they included
different sentiments, would include approval of
kicking dogs.
Each of these might, consistently with the analysis of
completely evaluative conditionals, be taken to interpret
(D) . At least (D3) must be true - if we endorse any
sensibility at all, we must endorse ones which include
approval of kicking dogs if they include approval of kicking
dogs. Though less obviously, (D2) is also true. Our
endorsements of sensibilities are (crucially for the quasi-
realist construction) themselves sentiments. So if our
sentiments about sensibilities including approval of
kicking dogs (which, I take it, are among our sentiments
about kicking dogs) were reversed, we would endorse such
sensibilities.
So quasi-realism does not clearly have the result that
(D) is false. If the question were whether (D) is a true
63
evaluation
y and we tried to apply the account of moral truth
rather than the account of conditionals, it might be that
(Dl) would be the uniquely relevant interpretation, but it
would be preposterous to understand an assertion of mind-
dependence as an evaluation. In any case, even if we take
it as non-evaluative, the falsity of (Dl) represents at most
a very limited kind of "mind-independence”, while the truth
of (D2) represents a rather serious kind of "mind-
dependence" .
No doubt Blackburn would protest that, since (D2)
interprets (D) as not a first-order evaluation, it is of no
concern to quasi-realism and that, furthermore, it makes
evaluations dependent only on second-order sentiments. [33]
But I don't see how this can help. We have already noted
the failure of various attempts to specify the kind of "mind-
independence" required for moral realism, and I don't
pretend to have a better one. Still, I think I have some
grasp on at least one idea that may lie behind the objection
that evaluations dependent on our sentiments can't "matter"
in the way that evaluations backed by "independent reality"
can matter: "mind-dependent" evaluations can't offer enough
resistance to our desires. There are two factors in this
lack of resistance: first, that, at least sometimes, we are
able to change our sentiments; and, second, that any
resistance such evaluations can offer is ultimately backed
only by more of the same sort of thing they are to resist.
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Suppose I have a strong urge to kick my dog - an urge
only by my knowledge that kicking dogs is wrong.
And suppose I could make it right to kick dogs by changing
attitude toward certain sensibilities. And suppose that
I am able to change my attitude toward these sensibilities.
I am then left with just a conflict between two of my
sentiments, and, since both are just sentiments of mine, I
have no apparent reason not to let the stronger prevail,
whichever it may be.
I am not arguing that this is a crushing problem (or,
for that matter, any problem) for theories that make
evaluations dependent on sentiments; only that if it is a
problem, then quasi-realism has it no less than the rest.
Perhaps quasi-realism could claim an advantage if there were
some evidence that sentiments about sensibilities are
generally more forceful or harder to change than ordinary
"first-order" attitudes, but I see no hint of any such
evidence. The simple fact of being second-order, it seems
to me, gives sentiments no extra weight.
Whatever merits quasi-realism may have as a
sophisticated version of non-cognitivism, it's reproductions
of realist positions on the issues of truth and mind-
dependence are readily discernible from the originals.
In an early introduction of quasi-realism, Blackburn
says it's "success would be a measure of the difficulty of
defining a genuine debate between realism and its
opponents." [34] I agree that, if a "proj activist" theory
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could be shown to permit truth and mind-independence to
evaluations in all the ways realist theories permit, we
would have to give up trying to define realism in terms of
truth and mind-dependence. Does the failure of quasi-
realism, then, show that realism can be defined in some such
way? Maybe it provides a bit of confirmation.
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CHAPTER 5
WHAT IS THE AUTONOMY OF ETHICS?
The doctrine that ethical conclusions cannot be
derived from non-ethical premises has been extensively
attacked in recent decades. One class of objections,
due largely to John Searle and Max Black, consists of
attempts to show that ethics is not autonomous. [1] i
do not discuss these objections here. The objections I
do want to consider seem to have originated with A.N.
Prior and D. Rynin. [2] Their point is, I think, not
that ethics is not autonomous, but rather that the
autonomy of ethics is not adequately represented by the
principle:
AEO: No valid argument has only non-ethical premises and
ethical conclusion
or by any principle much like this.
While Prior's objections do, at first, seem to be
logical pleasantries, I argue in this chapter that
several attempts to circumvent them by logical
maneuvering are unsuccessful. Each of the principles
suggested either falls to examples much like Prior's, or
fails to preserve certain features, for example, certain
relations to other doctrines, particularly ethical
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naturalism [3], that autonomism is generally thought to
have.
Prior gives these counterexamples to AEO:
I. (1) Tea-drinking is common in England
(2) Either tea-drinking is common in England or
all New Zealanders ought to be shot
II. (3) There is no man over twenty feet high
(4) There is no man over twenty feet high who
is allowed to sit in an ordinary chair.
III. (5) Undertakers are church officers.
(6) Undertakers ought to do whatever all
church officers ought to do.
IV. (7) No one ought to do what is invariably
accompanied by the doing of something
wrong
.
(8) X.Y. invariably acts as he says he will
act.
(9) X.Y. ought never to say that he will do
anything he ought not to do. [4]
There is no question about the validity of the
arguments (except, perhaps, in the case of IV) and
hardly any question but that the conclusions are ethical
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statements. [5] The conclusions are not, we might be
tempted to say, "basic" or "simple" or "useful" ethical
statements, but then not all ethical statements are
"basic" or "simple" or "useful'. I think it is also
uncontroversial that the premises of the first three
inferences are non-ethical
. The status of (7) is more
controversial. I am inclined to think it is an ethical
statement. Prior claims it is a principle of deontic
logic, and that principles of deontic logic are not
ethical statements. I think we might reasonably dispute
both these claims, but for now I follow Prior's critics
in ignoring argument IV. The other arguments suffice,
in any case, to show that reformulation, if not
rejection, of the principle of the autonomy of ethics is
in order.
J. M. Shorter's brief discussion of Prior's
examples does not explicitly contain a reformulation of
the principle, but his remarks do suggest a
reformulation. Shorter agrees that the conclusions of
Prior's arguments are "ethical in a quite serious sense"
but insists that:
One must distinguish between the seriousness,
ethically speaking, of the conclusion and the
seriousness of the inference by which it is arrived
at. It may be the case that the conclusion is of
use in deriving definite specific moral duties only
if it is arrived at in some other way than by means
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of an inference from a purely non-ethical premise.
[ 6 ]
He describes Prior's inferences as "futile ethically"
and as "quite useless for anyone who wants to decide
what concrete action he ought to perform."
Shorter's point seems to be that no inference of
the sort Prior gives can play a part in a (larger)
argument whose conclusion is a "specific ethical duty".
He remarks that the inference from (5) to (6) is
"otiose" in arguments of this form:
V. (5) Undertakers are church officers.
(6) Undertakers ought to do what all church
officers ought to do.
(10) Church officers ought not to do X.
(11) Undertakers (including myself) ought not to
do X.
While Shorter doesn't say what it is to be a
"specific ethical duty", he evidently regards any result
of replacing "X" in (11) by a term referring to some
specific concrete action as expressing a specific
ethical duty. Depending on what we make of the
parenthetical phrase in (11), we can get two versions of
the form of (11)
:
(lla) (y) (Fy > y ought not to do X) , and
(llb) a ought not to do X.
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Corresponding to these, we can get two defintions of
"specific ethical duty":
Dl: p is a specific ethical duty(l) =df (EF) (EX) (p
entails (y) (Fy > y ought to do X))
;
D2
: p is a specific ethical duty(2) =df (Ey) (EX) (p
entails y ought to do X)
It seems pretty clear, however, that Shorter would do
better endorsing the second than the first. Very slight
modification of Prior's example II shows that a specific
ethical duty(l) can be derived from non-ethical
premises
:
(12) There is no man over twenty feet high.
(13) Every man over twenty feet high ought to
refrain from sitting on this chair now.
In this respect, D2 is more promising. There seems
little hope that Prior's arguments can, without
significant alteration, be made to have specific ethical
duties (2) for their conclusions.
I think Shorter does not mean to say that we can
capture the autonomy of ethics by this principle:
AEl: No valid argument has non-ethical premises and
a conclusion that is a specific ethical duty (2)
In any case, AEl is not a satisfactory autonomy
principle. Suppose that we can derive from non-ethical
premises certain general normative principles, such as
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"An act is right if and only if it maximizes utility."
or certain conclusions about value, such as "There being
happy penguins is intrinsically good." or certain "prima
facie duties" such as "If Jones promised to jump, he has
a prima ^cie duty to jump." or certain conditional
obligations, such as "If Jones goes to the aid of his
^®^9^^t)ors, he ought to tell them he's coming." or
certain claims of permission, such as "Infanticide is
sometimes morally right." I think that under these
conditions, we would not be inclined to declare ethics
autonomous. There is nothing obviously incoherent in
holding that we can have factual criteria for items of
these kinds but can never, without additional ethical
premises, derive a specific ethical duty (2) . A theory
holding this would, I think, be contrary to the autonomy
of ethics but not contrary to AEl.
Shorter's contention is that although the
conclusions of Prior's examples are the right sorts of
conclusions for counterexamples to the autonomy of
ethics, the inferences are inappropriate. AEl restricts
the conclusions, not the inferences. His suggestion
seems to be rather that any "ethically serious
inference" must be able to contribute to the derivation
of a specific ethical duty (2) . Prior's inferences, he
seems to think, are incapable of making such
contributions. We can find some intuitive appeal in
this proposal if we consider Prior's example II. Any
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duties derived with the aid of this argument must, it
seems, be the duties of non-existent men, hence not
specific ethical duties(2).
A fairly straightforward way of obtaining a
restricted autonomy principle from what Shorter says,
particularly about argument V, is as follows. We might
say:
D3: A is an ethically serious inference =df (EB) (B is a
valid argument & the conclusion of B is a specific
ethical duty (2) & A is an essential part of B)
D4: A is an essential part of B =df A and B are valid
inferences & A is a part of B & the result of deleting
the conclusion of A from B is not valid.
The autonomy of ethics, we might then say, comes to
this
:
AE2 : No valid ethically serious inference has non-
ethical premises and ethical conclusion.
But this proposal is no advance from AEl. AE2 is
equivalent to AEl. No valid inference has a valid
essential part other than itself. So no valid argument
is an ethically serious inference, according to these
definitions, unless its conclusion is a specific
ethical duty (2)
.
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A natural idea [7] somewhat akin to AEl stems from
the observation that none of Prior's conclusions implies
either that something is obligatory or that nothing is
obligatory - they are compatible with both moral
nihilism and its denial. So, it may seem, we can say:
D5: S is an interesting ethical conclusion =df S implies
that something is obligatory or S implies that
nothing is obligatory.
Thus we could say:
AE3 : No valid argument has only non-ethical premises and
interesting ethical conclusion.
But I think if we could find a derivation from non-
ethical premises of such statements as "If anything is
obligatory then shooting New Zealanders is obligatory."
though this is not an interesting conclusion by D5, we
would have reason to deny the autonomy of ethics and
would not have a counterexample to AE3
.
Frank Jackson has proposed a somewhat differently
modified autonomy principle in response to Prior-type
examples. [8] He observes that in several of these
examples the validity of the argument is "independent of
the meanings of the ethical terms." Jackson does not,
however, accept the principle to which this observation
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might most directly lead. That is, he rejects the
principle that every argument from non-ethical premises
to othical conclusion is, if valid, valid independently
of the meanings of the ethical terms.
For one thing, he claims to have a counterexample:
(14) Joe hit Bill.
(15) If Joe ought not to hit Bill, then Joe was
wrong to hit Bill.
This argument, he claims, is valid, has a non-ethical
premise, has an ethical conclusion, and depends on the
meanings of the terms involved. For another thing, he
has an intuition:
A successful modified definition of the autonomy of
ethics might embody the idea that valid arguments
from factual premises to ethical conclusions are
not valid in virtue of the meaning relations
between ethical and factual terms. [9]
That an argument's validity is independent of the
meanings of ethical terms is, Jackson points out, only
one sufficient condition for the argument's not being
valid in virtue of the meaning relations between ethical
and factual terms. Another sufficient condition is
independence of the meanings of factual terms.
Jackson's autonomy principle, roughly, is that any valid
argument with only factual premises and ethical
conclusion is either valid independently of the meanings
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its ethical teirms or valid independently of the
meanings of all its factual terms.
In order to give a precise version of this
principle, Jackson introduces some technical
expressions: "We call an argument whose validity is
independent of the meaning of a term, T, T-invariant -
that is, an argument is T-invariant just if (i) it is
valid, and (ii) its validity is independent of the
meaning of T ...suppose an argument is Tl, T2,...Tn-
invariant, and that Tl...Tn are all the terms of type C
which appear in the argument, the argument may be said
to be C-invariant .
" [10] An argument is valid
independently of the meaning of a term if the term "may
be replaced by any (grammatically proper, meaningful)
term without affecting the validity of the argument."
[11] Ethical terms, he says, are terms like "good",
"right", "ought", and so on, specified by "a technique
of listing akin to that used in logic texts to specify
the logical particles." But the list is longer than we
might at first suppose: "Terms like 'murder' and
'industrious' which intuitively might be classified as
both factual and ethical, are classified as ethical and
not factual." Factual terms, finally, are "terms which
are neither ethical terms nor logical particles." [12]
Jackson's official autonomy principle is this:
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AE4 : No argument from factual premises to an ethical
conclusion is valid unless it is either factual-
invariant or ethical invariant or is reducible to
such by synonymy substitution.
The last bit, about synonymy substitution, is intended
to allow for such arguments as:
(16) Joe did not kill Peter.
(17) Joe did not murder Peter.
This argument from factual premise to (arguably) ethical
conclusion is, Jackson claims, neither factual-invariant
nor ethical invariant. But substitution of "kill Peter
in a morally unjustified manner" for "murder Peter" in
the conclusion yields a factual-and-ethical-invariant
argument.
We should notice that there is one defect AE4 might
be thought to have but in fact does not have. [13]
"Valid" is often used to mean "having a logically valid
form". Given this sense of "valid", we can say that
every valid argument is both factual-invariant and
ethical-invariant, and, in fact, everything-but-logical-
particle-invariant . Given this use of "valid", then,
AE4 is trivially true, hence not an adequate autonomy
principle. Jackson clearly uses "valid" to mean
something more like "such that, necessarily, if the
premises are true, the conclusion is true."
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There is, however, a related defect that Jackson
acknowledges his principle may have. He puts the
objection this way:
Let P, .
. Q be a putative counterexample to [AE4];
that is, it is valid, neither ethical nor factual
invariant, and P is a factual and Q an ethical
statement. Then P, .. P v Q will be ethical-
invariant (obviously)
. And so, if we allow
replacing Q by P v Q as a synonymy substitution on
the ground that they are logically eguivalent
(which follows from the validity of P, .
. Q) it
would be impossible to get a counterexample to
[AE4]. [14]
Jackson responds by requiring that the synonymy
substitutions be backed by "a non-circular analysis into
more basic elements." Incorporating this restriction
into AE4, we get the following principle:
AE4*: Every valid argument. A, is such that if the
premises of A are factual and the conclusion of
A is ethical, then either A is factual-invariant
or A is ethical-invariant, or there are analytic
definitions such that the result of substituting
the definientia for all occurrences of the
definienda in A is either factual-invariant or
ethical invariant.
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AE4* is not trivially true. it succeeds in
disqualifying Prior's I, II, and III, which are ethical-
invariant. But it will not do as an autonomy principle.
AE4* gets the relation between autonomism and naturalism
wrong
.
Naturalistic theories typically include definitions
in each of which the definiendum is an ethical term and
the definiens is a complex of non-ethical terms.
Suppose, for instance, that some naturalist endorses
this definition of goodness:
Dn: p is good -df it is possible that someone desires p.
Our naturalist might argue as follows:
(18) Jones desires that the coffee shop be open
all night.
(19) The coffee shop's being open all night is
good.
According to Jackson's definitions, this argument has a
factual premise and an ethical conclusion. Moreover, it
seems that on any account that allows a distinction
between factual and ethical statements at all, (18) will
be factual and (19) will be ethical. If our
naturalist's view were true, the argument would be
valid. Now, substituting on the basis of Dn, we get:
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(18) Jones desires that the coffee shop be open
all night.
(19) It is possible that someone desires the coffee
shop's being open all night.
The argument is obviously factual-invariant [15] and
seems to be vacuously ethical-invariant. If our
naturalistic definition were correct, then, the argument
from (18) to (19) would not be a counterexample to AE4*,
although it would seem to be a counterexample to any
acceptable autonomy principle.
A thoroughgoing naturalist will be prepared to
analyse all ethical conclusions in factual terms. So,
if some thoroughgoing naturalist is right, then all
valid arguments to ethical conclusions are reducible by
substitution on the basis of analyses to arguments that
are vacuously ethical-invariant. So, the truth of some
such naturalistic theory would not be contrary to AE4*.
But no acceptable autonomy principle can have this
result. Naturalism is generally taken to be a form of
anti-autonomism, and this is clearly right. If ethical
statements can be reduced by definitions to factual
statements, they can, a fortiori be deduced from factual
statements.
In "'Is', 'Ought', and the Autonomy of Ethics,"
David Kurtzman proposes the following as one claim that
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"remains for supporters of the thesis of the autonomy of
ethics"
:
There is no analytic truth of the form
(a) (b) . .
.
(c) ( S > T )
where S and T contain zero or more free occurrences
of a, b,...or c, and where T contains one or more
occurrences of expressions from L which is not
either;
1. a theorem of elementary logic
2 . a theorem of deontic logic
3. such that an expression from L occurs in S, or
4. such that each occurrence in T of an expression
from L is contingently vacuous (3). [16]
L is an exhaustive list of ethical terms. Kurtzman's
definition of "contingently vacuous (3) is this; "an
occurrence of a predicate in the consequent of a
statement is contingently vacuous (3) if (and only if) it
may be replaced by an occurrence of any other predicate
so as to preserve the analyticity of the resulting
statement." [17] Kurtzman admits that "we lack adequate
criteria for analyticity; we know as yet no way of
filling out the vocabulary L; and the final shape of
deontic logic is currently unsettled", [18] but he holds
that "whatever follows by definition and pure logic from
an analytic statement is analytic." [19]
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we canGiven this principle about analyticity,
produce counterexamples to Kurtzman's autonomy principle
much like Prior's original examples. For instance:
(22) (x) (x is a brother > (a) ( (y) (y is male > y ought
to do a) > X ought to do a)
)
seems to be of the proper form. It follows by
definition and pure logic from analytic truths, is a
theorem of neither elementary nor deontic logic, and
contains no ethical expression in the part corresponding
to S. Moreover, neither occurrence of "ought" is
within a predicate which is contingently vacuous (3): the
result of replacing the first (or the second) occurrence
of "ought" by an occurrence of "wants" is not analytic.
Of course, the result of replacing both occurrences
of "ought" in (22) by occurrences of other
(grammatically appropriate) expressions will be analytic
by Kurtzman's standard. So it might seem that what we
need is a different concept of contingent vacuousness:
D6 : An occurrence of a predicate, P, is contingently
vacuous (4) in statement S =df S is analytic & for
any predicate, Q, the result of replacing all
occurrences of P in S by occurrences of Q is
analytic. [20]
85
But we can borrow an example from Jackson to show that
even this concept of contingent vacuousness does not
help. Even with "contingently vacuous(4)" in place of
"contingently vacuous(3)", Kurtzman's principle fails to
exclude such cases as
(23) (X) (y) (X didn't kill y > x didn't murder y)
,
and
(24) (x) (y) (x didn't alter y > x didn't improve y)
.
(23) and (24) seem to follow by "pure logic" from
analytic truths and seem to satisfy Kurtzman's other
conditions. The occurrences in them of ethical terms
are clearly not contingently vacuous (4). One might deny
that "murder" and "improve" are ethical expressions, but
I think that on any view of what ethical expressions
are, there will be some expressions that have both an
ethical "part" and a non-ethical "part". If we count
these mixed expressions ethical, we can produce
statements relevantly like (23) and (24). If we count
them non-ethical
,
we can produce counterexamples to
Kurtzman's principle relevantly like:
(25) (x) (x improved > x became better than it was)
.
Kurtzman finally suggests a simpler principle:
There is no correct definition of the form '"..."
means the same as "..."' such that one side
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contains an expression from L while the other does
not. [21]
According to Kurtzman, anyone who holds that his first
principle is true must also hold that this one is true.
I am not sure that Kurtzman offers this as an autonomy
principle. It may be that he intends only to claim that
it is a consequence of the autonomy of ethics.
Hector-Neri Castaneda, however, does quite
explicitly claim that the autonomy of ethics "consists
in the unanalyzability of some practical concepts, e.g.,
ought " and that "the crucial autonomy thesis" is;
Ought-judgments are not analyzable into, i.e., are
not reducible to purely factual propositions. [22]
I think this is not entirely satisfactory as an
autonomy thesis. A decent illustration of its
inadequacy is provided by an example Castaneda himself
gives to show that nothing stronger than unanalyzability
has any chance of being true. He offers as a "non-
controversial case" of "bridging implications linking
facts to oughts" the following inference:
X is wholly unable to affect other sentient or
thinking beings.
X wants that p be the case more than anything else.
X can bring it about that p.
It is (will be) the case that p only if X performs
A at t.
X can perform A at t.
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-Hence
,
X ought, everything being considered, to do
A at t. [23]
Far from being non-controversial
,
the inference
cries out for some premise to the effect that what X
wants to do has some bearing on what X ought to do.
Although it involves no analysis, it seems to me to be
just the sort of thing autonomists should reject. In
fact, this inference seems to me to be of just the sort
that makes us think there must be something right about
AEO.
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CHAPTER 6
PARFIT ON SELVES AND THEIR INTERESTS
Derek Parfit begins Reasons and Persons [1] by
introducing "the Self-interest Theory" of rationality.
He says "the central claim" of this theory is:
(SI) For each person, there is one supremely
rational ultimate aim: that his life go, for him,
as well as possible, [p. 4]
Parfit offers several arguments against the Self-
interest Theory in the course of the book. Only one of
these rests on his major metaphysical thesis about the
nature of persons. In fact this argument is one of the
main links between his theory of persons and his theory
of reasons. I wish to show that, if we take seriously
the theory of persons, the argument fails.
The metaphysical thesis in question (Parfit calls
it "the Reductionist View") is that "a person is not
like a Cartesian Ego, a being whose existence must be
all or nothing. A person is like a nation." [p. 275]
According to the form of the thesis he defends,
psychological connectedness and continuity replace
personal identity - these relations "are what matter" in
the way personal identity is ordinarily thought to
matter, [pp. 275, 282, 307, 313]
If we accept the Reductionist View, Parfit claims,
we must accept
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(C) My concern for my future may correspond to the
degree of connectedness between me now and myself
in the future. Connectedness is one of the two
relations that give me reasons to be specially
concerned about my own future. It can be rational
to care less, when one of the grounds for caring
will hold to a lesser degree. Since connectedness
is nearly always weaker over long periods, I can
rationally care less about my further future, [p.
313]
But (C) contradicts a principle Parfit claims is
"central to the Self-interest Theory":
The Requirement of Equal Concern : A rational person
would be equally concerned about all the parts of
his future, [p. 327]
He concludes that we should reject the Self-interest
Theory.
Parfit considers the reply that seems right to me -
a version of the Self-interest Theory that leaves out
the Requirement of Equal Concern:
On the Revised Theory, a rational person's dominant
concern should be his own future, but he may be
less concerned about those parts of his future to
which he is less closely connected, [p. 317]
He rejects the revision as departing too far from the
original to rescue it:
This revision makes a big difference. It breaks
the link between the Self-interest Theory and what
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is in one's own best interests. On the unrevised
or Classical Theory
, it is irrational for anyone to
do what he believes will be worse for him. On the
Revised Theory, this claim must be abandoned. If
it is not irrational to care less about some parts
of one's future, it may not be irrational to do
what one believes will be worse for oneself. It
may not be irrational to act, knowingly, against
one's own self-interest.
...we must abandon the Classical Theory's central
claim. Consider acts of gross or great
imprudence. For the sake of small pleasures in my
youth, I cause it to be true that I shall suffer
greatly in my old age. I might, for instance,
start smoking when I am a boy. I know that I am
likely to impose on myself a premature and painful
death. I know that what I am doing is likely to be
much worse for me. Since we must reject the
Classical Theory, we cannot claim that all such
acts are irrational, [p. 317]
Recall that the central claim of the Self-interest
theory is (SI) . Since (SI) refers to people and their
lives, we should presumably interpret it in light of the
theory that these are not "all or nothing". Parfit
proposes that, instead of talking about people and their
lives, we talk about "successive selves": "On my
proposed way of talking, we use "I", and the other
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pronouns, to refer only to the parts of our lives to
which, when speaking, we have the strongest
psychological connections." [p. 304] He warns that this
way of talking is suited only to cases "where there is
some sharp discontinuity, marking the boundary between
two selves", [p. 306] but says also "Since this
connectedness is a matter of degree, the drawing of
these distinctions can be left to the choice of the
speaker, and be allowed to vary from context to
context." [p. 304] In the context of the Self-interest
Theory, it seems appropriate to distinguish successive
selves wherever the connectedness between two bits of
life drops sufficiently to justify a difference of
concern about their interests.
I think we may suppose that, for any pair of
selves, si and s j , the extent to which they are
connected can be represented by a number between 1 and
0, C(si,sj). Maximal connectedness is represented by 1,
so that, normally, C(si,sj)=l only if si=sj . If si is
not at all connected with s j , C(si,sj)=0, and
intermediate degrees of connection get intermediate
numbers. Let "V(si)" represent the extent to which
things go well for si - the better they go, the higher
the number. Each non-zero product C (si , sj ) V(sj
)
will
then represent the extent to which things go well for
one of si's successive selves, weighted according to the
the connection between that self and si.
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I suggest that one natural rendition of (SI) in
this reductionist way of talking is the Reductionist
Self-interest Theory:
(RSI) For each self, s, there is one supremely
rational ultimate aim: that the sum, for all si, of
[C(s,si) V(si) ] be maximal.
The "classical" Self-interest theory follows from (RSI)
together with the classical assumption that, for each
self, there is just one self connected with it.
(RSI) does license acts ordinarily regarded as
imprudent, such as smoking when a boy, when the future
suffering is sufficiently mitigated by decreased
connection. But Parfit is not entitled to describe this
as the consequence that "it may not be irrational to do
what one believes will be worse for oneself". On his
account, the present self will not be around by the time
things get worse, and the self that will then be its
successor is not fully connected with it.
Nor is (RSI) open to Parfit 's two minor
objections. He says it is a weakness of the Revised
Theory that it introduces a "discount rate" , hence needs
to "explain what makes a discount rate too steep." [p.
318] (RSI) discounts the interests of future selves
just in proportion to their lack of connection with the
present self.
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H© claims also that the Revised Theory is not a
version of the Self-interest Theory but a version of the
Critical Present-aim Theory, [p. 317] On the Critical
Present-aim Theory, "each person has most reason to
achieve those of his present aims that are not
intrinsically irrational." [p. 92] (RSI) says nothing
about anyone's actual present aims, in fact, nothing
about what makes things go well for a self.
Parfit discusses, but declines to decide among,
three "theories of self-interest": the "Hedonistic
Theory", the "Desire-fulfilment Theory", and the
"Objective List Theory" [p. 4]. It seems to be the
Desire- fulfilment version of (RSI) that is most in
danger of approaching the Critical Present-aim Theory,
but even that doesn't quite arrive - it counts the
desires of future selves less heavily than it counts
present desires, but it does count them. Parfit earlier
claims that every theory of rationality is a version of
the Critical Present-aim Theory - given suitable
interpretation of "intrinsically irrational", the actual
present aims just drop out [p. 194]. I'm not convinced
about this, but if it were true, it would be misleading
to suggest that being a version of the Critical Present-
aim Theory tells against being a version of the Self-
interest Theory.
I think the point of the Self-interest Theory has
not been lost in the translation. In particular, the
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revised Self-interest Theory can be contrasted with
other theories of rationality in much the way the old
one can. The contrasts are not as sharp as before,
since we are supposing that people might be, so to
speak, fuzzy around the edges, but they remain
recognizable contrasts. The Self-interest Theory, for
sll Parfit has shown, remains a rival to universalistic
theories of rationality as well as to (standard) present-
aim theories.
Note
Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984) . Page numbers in square
brackets in this chapter refer to pages in Reasons and
Persons
.
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CHAPTER 7
PARFIT ON RATIONALITY AND OBJECTIVE SELF-INTEREST
In the chapter of Reasons and Persons [1] called
"The Best Objection to the Self-interst Theory", Parfit
advances an argument he calls "My First Argument". He
claims that, if what someone most wants to do is to help
other people, or create masterpieces, or make
fundamental discoveries, it may be rational for him to
choose to suffer, neglect his happiness, even die, for
the sake of these goals. I agree. (In fact, I'd say it
might be rational to choose suffering and death even for
less exalted goals, and even if achieving the goal is
not what the agent most wants.) Parfit claims this
shows it might be rational for someone to sacrifice his
self-interest for the sake of other goals, hence that we
should reject the theory of rationality according to
which each person is rationally required to do whatever
will make his life go, for him, as well as possible.
[pp. 130ff]
In making these claims, Parfit at first assumes a
hedonistic view about self-interest. Given this
assumption, his claims seem fairly safe - it is fairly
obvious that acting for the sake of other people, or on
the basis of what Parfit calls "desires for
achievement", can be detrimental to the agent's balance
of pain and pleasure. Parfit later concedes that, "by
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changing our view about self-interest, we can postpone"
rejecting the self-interest theory of rationality, [p.
464] I think we can postpone it indefinitely.
The "desire-fulfilment" theory of self-interest
seems to hold some promise here, since, in the cases at
hand, the agent's strongest desire is for certain
achievements, or for helping others. Parfit argues
that, even so, conflicts can arise between those goals
and the agent's self-interest: it may happen that a
desire for achievement or an altruistic desire, however
strong at one time, is outweighed by other desires the
agent has at other times. So it may be that the total
satisfaction of the agent's desires during his life will
be hindered by the satisfaction of desires that are only
temporarily strongest. Since it is total satisfaction
of desires that determines self-interest on this theory,
acting on these temporarily strongest desires may still
be contrary to the agent's self-interest, hence
irrational on the self-interest theory of rationality.
Finally, Parfit considers the "Objective List"
theory of self-interest, according to which "certain
things are good or bad for us, whatever our desires may
be"
:
On the Objective List Theory, some kinds of
achievement may be one of the things that are good
for us, and make our lives go better. (sic) But
there will be several other things that are good
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for us, such as the mutual love of two adults,
having and loving children, the development of a
full range of abilities, and the awareness of all
kinds of beauty. It may be true that, to fulfil my
desire for achievement, I must deny myself most of
the other things that are good for me. I may thus
be doing what, on the Objective List Theory, will
on the whole be worse for me. But since I am
fulfilling a desire for achievement, we decided
that I am not acting irrationally, [p. 467]
Thinking he has exhausted the plausible theories of
self-interest, Parfit concludes that we can no longer
change our view about self-interest, thus "have no
alternative" but to change our view about rationality.
We do have an alternative. We might,
provisionally, call it the "Objective No-list Theory".
Parfit evidently supposes that the Objective List Theory
commits us to a kind of mechanical procedure for
evaluating a life - we count up the things it includes
from the good list, subtract the things it contains from
the bad list. Perhaps the procedure is a little more
complicated - perhaps some good items are better than
others, perhaps some bad items are worse than others,
perhaps adding more of an item already represented
counts - but it is clear that he envisions some such
procedure. The theory is as plausible as the culinary
theory according to which, since cherries and chocolate
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and oysters and olives can all contribute to making some
food good, the best food must have as much as possible
of each.
Moore said about intrinsic value that "the value of
a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of
the values of it parts." [2] The Objective No-list
Theory takes this to be true about selfish value. The
Objective No-list Theory also insists that self-interest
depend on values of whole lives. (I expect the No-list
Theory could be adjusted to accommodate metaphysical
theories (among which Parfit's may be one) according to
which whole lives are not the appropriate entities to
consider, though the adjusted theories are likely to be
as complicated as the metaphysical views themselves.)
Without the assumption that the (objective) value
of a life can be more or less mechanically calculated on
the basis of a list, Parfit can no longer show that
satisfaction of altruistic desires or desires for
achievement can conflict with self-interest objectively
construed. Certainly he can't show this by pointing out
that achievement or altruistic action can exclude most
other good things.
Even on the No-list Theory, of course, we can't
show that rational desires for altruism or achievement
cannot conflict with self-interest. But it would take a
much longer story than Parfit tells to show that there
can be such conflicts - it would take fairly detailed
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stories of whole lives and their alternatives Our
intuitions about the cases he sketches might be guite
^iifsrent once all the details are filled in. It might
turn out that those desires for achievement or altruism
whose satisfaction still seems contrary to self-interest
have, on more detailed inspection, stopped seeming
rational
. This might happen even in such extreme cases
as that which Parfit imagines:
My Heroic Death I choose to die in a way that I
know will be painful, but will save the lives of
several other people. I am doing what, knowing the
facts and thinking clearly, I most want to do, and
what best fulfils my present desires... I also know
that what I am doing will be worse for me. If I
did not sacrifice my life to save these other
people, I would not be haunted by remorse. The
rest of my life would be well worth living, [p.
132 ]
Let's suppose it is all as Parfit describes, except for
the claim that he knows that what he is doing will be
worse for him. Whether it will be worse for him is part
of what is at issue, but we can grant him the belief
that heroic death will be worse for him, and some
evidence for the belief. Before granting its truth, we
should consider some evidence against it.
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Saving the lives of several other people is, after
all, a rare and splendid achievement. Ending heroically
with this achievement is an impressive guality for a
have, especially for the life of someone whose
desire at the time is thereby satisfied, even
when that desire emanates from clear thinking and
knowledge of the facts. This life will have some
salient parts fitting together in a remarkable way. A
plausible No-list Theory might accord a life a good deal
of value on the basis of these features.
Such a theory might, furthermore, rate it more
valuable than certain other lives Parfit might live were
he to decide against the heroic death, even if the parts
of these lives after the opportunity for heroism would
be, as Parfit specifies, well worth living. One
possibility is this: he goes home, happily tends his
garden for a few months, then dies in his sleep. It
might be plausible to hold that the life with the heroic
end is a better life than the one with the peaceful end
(though I think this would depend on other aspects of
the lives, and notably on the character of the man)
.
It might be, on the other hand, that he is capable
of other splendid achievements. Maybe he could get some
food to each of a thousand starving Somali children. In
that case, however, we should begin to doubt that the
heroic choice would be rational. We should, at least.
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inquire more closely into the calculations that would
lead to it.
Or he might have available a very fine life in
which he is of not much benefit to other people. I
expect this is the sort of case that would best support
Parfit's contentions. It would not, I guess, be
plausible to say that no amount of profound solitary
pleasures and achievements would make a life as good as
the heroic one. Even so, it would be no simple matter
to establish that the heroic choice would be both worse
for him and rational. We would, I think, have to
scrutinize both the details of the reasoning behind the
choice and the details of the life he would choose to
give up. Being based on a desire to help other people
does not by itself guarantee a piece of reasoning.
Parfit is no more entitled to assume that it is always
rational to aim for the greatest happiness of the
greatest number than the Self-interest Theorist is
entitled to assume that it is always rational to aim for
the best available life.
My point is that ordinary philosophical methods are
inadequate for settling the issue of whether rationality
and self-interest can diverge, if self-interest is
construed according to the Objective No-list Theory.
Part of what would be required to settle the question
would be something on the order of full-scale
biographies for each alternative. Unless we can rule
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out the Objective No-list Theory, ordinary
counterexamples are too small to show rationality is not
a matter of maximizing objective self-interest.
Notes
1. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford; Oxford
University Press, 1984). Page numbers in square
brackets in this chapter refer to pages in Reasons and
Persons .
2. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1912), p. 28.
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APPENDIX
FELDMAN'S ANSWER TO "WHY SHOULD I BE MORAL?"
Fred Feldman suggests [1] we interpret the question
"Why should I be moral?" as asking "Why is it that I
just plain ought to do what I morally ought to do?",
where "just plain" obligation is "the most all-inclusive
kind of obligation," and such that if we just plain
ought to act according to one rather than another of two
conflicting requirements, then the one overrides, is
more important than, the other. So Feldman supposes we
can answer the question by showing that moral
obligations are more important than other obligations.
I don't want to dispute his formulation of the
question here, though I think philosophers who have
found the question compelling have often understood it
to be asking for motivating reasons to obey the
requirements of morality. I do want to dispute a bit of
the reasoning by which Feldman tries to arrive at an
answer to the question.
Feldman holds that a person's moral obligations
depend on the intrinsic values of the worlds accessible
to him, while other kinds of obligation depend on other
kinds of value and other kinds of possibility. His
answer to (his version of) the question "why should I be
moral?" is that
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. . .we just plain ought to do what we morally ought
to do because moral obligation is directly based on
intrinsic value and regular accessibility, and
these are the most important sorts of value and
possibility for the appraisal of human action, [p.
215]
Why are this kind of value and this kind of
possibility more important than the rest? Feldman says:
It is natural to assume that intrinsic value is
more fundamental and important than any other sort
of value. This intuition is based on the fact that
intrinsic value is both necessary and
unrelativized. In these respects, intrinsic value
is unlike extrinsic value, value-for-the-agent
,
value-for-the-group, and "lawfulness". It is an
objective, necessary, and person-independent sort
of value. Some of these other sorts of value may
be explained by appeal to intrinsic value, but
intrinsic value cannot be explained by appeal to
them. .
.
[pp. 214-5]
This already assumes that at least one of these other
kinds of value must have some bearing on what we just
plain ought to do. This assumption could use some
justification. But that's not the main problem. We can
see what, according to me, is the main problem by
noticing that Feldman goes on to say:
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similarly, ... if the question is 'What should I
do?', it seems most fitting to focus first on what
I can do. In my view, this is the same as
focussing on the worlds accessible to me. Other
sorts of possiblity . . . seem much less relevant,
.
.
things that are possible in these ways... may not
be possible for me
. [p. 215 ]
Let's grant the last part - that in answering the
question "What should I do?" (or, for that matter, the
question "Why should I be moral?") the most relevant
sort of possibility is determined by what I can do. But
now, the parallel way to reason is clearly this; in
answering these questions about my doings, the most
relevant kind of value to consider is whatever is the
kind of value most important for me . Kinds of value
that are important in some absolute way may not be so
important for me . I see no reason to think that the
kind of value most important for me will be an
"unrelativized" or "person-independent" kind of value.
It seems more likely that , it will be a kind of value
relativized to me. The relevant kind of value, though
relativized, might still be objective and necessary -
if, in particular, it is something like share of
intrinsic value, or the intrinsic value of my life.
The claim that intrinsic value is conceptually
prior to other kinds of value is not enough. For one
thing, many philosophers would deny it is conceptually
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prior, claiming, in fact, that intrinsic value is to be
explained as some totality of intrinsic-value-for-
individuals. For another thing, it is by no means clear
why conceptual priority would make a kind of value
important for me, or even absolutely important in any
way connected with action or obligation. Feldman admits
that without a fuller account of the notion of
importance involved, what he has given is only an
outline of an answer to the question "Why should I be
moral?". I'd say that what he has given works every bit
as well as an outline for an answer to the question 'Why
should I be prudent?".
Note
1. Fred Feldman, Doing the Best We Can
,
(D. Reidel,
1986)
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